Working Paper 01-03 - Network industries in Belgium - Economic significance and reform by Dominique Gusbin et al.

























J. van der Linden
M. van Overbeke
January 2003Federal Planning Bureau
The Belgian Federal Planning Bureau (FPB) is a public agency under the authority
of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Economic Affairs. The FPB has a legal sta-
tus that gives it an autonomy and intellectual independence within the Belgian
federal public sector.
FPB’s activities are primarily focused on macroeconomic forecasting, analyzing and







The “Short Term Update”
Planning Papers (recent publications)
giving the results of policy analyses and assessments
91 Verkenning van de financiële evolutie van de sociale zekerheid 2000-2050 -
De vergrijzing en de leefbaarheid van het wettelijk pensioensysteem
M .E n g l e r t ,N .F a s q u e l l e ,M . - J .F e s t j e n s ,M .L a m b r e c h t ,M .S a i n t r a i n ,
C. Streel, S. Weemaes - January 2002
92 De administratieve lasten in België voor het jaar 2000 - Eindrapport
Greet De Vil, Chantal Kegels - January 2002
Working Papers (recent publications)
13-02 Stedelijke woondynamiek van de Belgische bevolking en haar gezinnen
D. Devogelaer - November 2002
14-02 Geographical agglomeration: the case of Belgian manufacturing industry
L. Bertinelli, J. Decrop - November 2002
15-02 Opleiding en kwalificaties, arbeidsmarkt en ICT: de rol van onderwijs en
training
Gijs J.M. Dekkers - November 2002
16-02 The New Economic Geography: a survey of the literature
D. Simonis - December 2002
Responsible Editor Henri Bogaert





I A horizontal analysis for Belgium 9
A. The analysis network industries 9
1. Concept and policy issues of network industries 9
2. The reform of network industries 12
3. The policy relevance for Belgium 15
B. Network industries in Belgium 15
1. Economic significance 16
2. Legislation and regulation 21
3. Progress in market opening 23
4. Performance of the network industries 30
II Telecommunications 35
A. The telecommunications sector in Belgium 35
1. The telecommunications sector 35
2. Sector structure 37
3. Legal Framework 40
4. Progress in market opening 42
B. Specific topics concerning telecommunications 45
1. Universal service, access, and public interest 45
2. Welfare effects 46
C. Annex 48
III Electricity 51
A. The electricity sector in Belgium 51
1. Sector structure 51
2. Legal framework 53
3. Progress in market opening 55Working Paper 1-03
B. Specific topics concerning electricity 57
1. Access to the network 57
2. Public Service Obligations 58
3. Welfare effects 59
4. Other topics 61
IV Gas 63
A. The gas sector in Belgium 63
1. Sector structure 63
2. Legal framework 64
3. Progress in market opening 66
B. Specific topics concerning gas 67
1. Access to the network 67
2. Public Service Obligations 67
3. Welfare effects 68
4. Other topics: long-term security of natural gas supply 71
V Postal services 73
A. The postal sector in Belgium 73
1. Sector structure 73
2. Legal framework 75
3. Progress in market opening 77
B. Specific topics concerning the postal services 77
1. Universal service obligations 77
2. Public service obligations 78
3. Welfare effects 79
VI Railways 81
A. The railway sector in Belgium 81
1. Sector structure 81
2. Legal framework 83
3. Progress in market opening 85
B. Specific topics concerning the railways 86
1. Access to the network 86
2. Public service obligations 87
3. Welfare effects 88
4. Other topics: modal split 89
VII References 91Working Paper 1-03
1
Preface
Since the reform of network industries is currently a topic of interest in the con-
text of market reforms and the completion of the internal market at the EU level,
theFederalPlanningBureau (FPB/BfP)hasbeguntoanalysetheevolution ofthese
industries in Belgium. Firstly a competence in telecoms and energy was built up,
followed later by railways and postal services. Initiatives were also taken to build
an integrated framework for the study of network industries. This would allow
for simultaneous and ‘horizontal’ analyses of network industries in Belgium. At
present the analysis is limited to five industries. These are the four industries
mentioned above, but with energy subdivided into electricity and gas.
This paper is the first result of the horizontal approach. It gives a 10-15 page in-
troduction to each of the five industries, placing the emphasis on their structure,
legislation, market opening and market performance. It begins with a general
synthesis, giving a brief introduction to the concept of network industries and
policy issues, and providing a horizontal benchmarking analysis for the five
industries.
This paper has been written by several authors so there will inevitably be differ-
ences in style and emphasis. Nevertheless, comparability between the chapters is
guaranteed through the use of a division into sections and subsections that is as
uniform as possible. Jan van der Linden wrote the synthesis (Chapter I) and, to-
gether with Patrick Vandenhove, the chapters on postal services (V) and railways
(VI). Chantal Kegels and Mary van Overbeke wrote the chapter on telecoms (II).
Dominique Gusbin wrote the chapters on electricity (III) and gas (IV).
We owe special thanks to Bruno Hoornaert who gathered most of the figures for
the chapters on electricity and gas. We would also like to thank Joost Verlinden
for his supervisory work and his valuable comments. Finally our thanks go to
Marleen Keytsman and Adinda De Saeger for their work on the layout of this
paper.




Network industries are industries whose activity involves conveying people,
productsorinformationfrom oneplacetotheothervia somekindofphysicalnet-
work. They include transport networks, information networks and utility
networks. Network industries basically consist of three types of activity: up-
stream activities involving the production of core products such as equipment
and means of transport; infrastructure activities involving the construction,
maintenance and operation of the physical network; downstream activities in-
volving the delivery of network services to final consumers. Network industries
have specific characteristics from an economic point of view. Three of these are
particularly notable, the last one also from a social perspective.
The first characteristic is the existence of network externalities. This means that
the benefit that a user derives from the network is determined not only by the use
of the network as such, but also by the total number of users. Other types of ex-
ternality may also occur, but these are not specific to network industries. The
second characteristic is the possible existence of natural monopolies in the infra-
structurenetwork.This meansthatitisnotalways efficient tohavemorethanone
network, thus placing the single network in a monopoly position. The third char-
acteristic is the delivery of services of public interest. From an economic
perspective this relates to the need to convey people, products and information.
From a social perspective it relates to the fact that many network services are con-
sidered as basic needs to which all citizens have the right of easy and affordable
access.
Network industries require a lot of attention during the present period. One im-
portantreasonforthis isthefactthat EU policy isfocusingonopeningthemarkets
in these industries, particularly telecoms, electricity, gas, postal services and rail-
ways. For many years most of these industries have been legal or de facto
monopolies at the national level and have thus been protectedfrom domestic and
foreign competition. One of the basic aims of the EU, however, is the creation of
an internal market for goods and services. In order to achieve this aim it is neces-
sary to open up the national markets to international competition. Moreover, the
EU has recently set itself a target ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world’. This requires the completion of the in-
ternal market and, where applicable, market reforms. The latter is needed in
particular in the network industries.
Network industries play a crucial role in the economy because the conveyance of
persons, products and information is essential for the production of goods and
services. Network industries that work efficiently contribute to the efficient func-
tioning of other industries andthus tothe competitiveness ofthe wholeeconomy.
It is therefore important for economic policy to create the conditions under which
network industries work efficiently. These conditions, however, are strongly in-Working Paper 1-03
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fluenced by the economic and social characteristics of network industries,
particularly natural monopolies and public-interest aspects.
Ina naturalmonopoly, amarket without government intervention may behavein
such a way that the public interest is not served. Network industries thereforede-
mand special attention from governments. In the past, this has led to the creation
of legal or de facto state-controlled (and often state-owned) monopolies that pro-
duced both the infrastructure and downstream activities. In the EU context,
however, the existence of such monopolies was not compatible with the internal
market, which is one of the basic objectives of the Treaty of Rome. They may also
hamper the efficient functioning of the network industries. This efficient func-
tioning can be regarded as a way of achieving the objective of the Lisbon strategy
to create the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world. Hence from
both EU and national perspectives, initiatives have been taken to reform certain
network industries.
The reforms are generally focused on the following areas, although there are dif-
ferent emphases in each industry: separation of infrastructure from downstream
activities; ensuring equal access for downstream service providers; control of ac-
cess and interconnection pricing; adequacy of investment programmes; phasing
of reforms; safeguarding of the public interest. A market regulator is generally
nominated. This market regulator may monitor the market, control and approve
prices, grant licences and act as an arbitrator. The regulator plays a crucial role in
shaping the conditions to allow a market to function efficiently. At the EU level,
one must be aware that more competition at the national level may well be cou-
pled with a higher market concentration at the EU level. Monitoring of possible
market power is therefore also an area to which the EU must pay attention.
This paper gives an overview of five Belgian network industries: telecoms, elec-
tricity, gas, postal services and railways. As we have seen, market reforms are a
current topic in these industries. The aim of this paper is to indicate the economic
significance of these industries, describe their structure and relevant legislation,
and indicate bottle-necks in the way they work at present.
The five network industries together produced 13.5 billion euro of value added
in 2001, which is 5.7% of Belgium's GDP. The industries employed 144,000 per-
sons, which is 4.2% of the Belgian total. Since 1995 value added growth in the
network industries has been significantly higher than GDP growth, whereas em-
ployment growth has been significantly lower. In absolute terms, net
employment creation only amounts to 2,200 jobs in six years. These changes im-
ply a significant increase in productivity, which has especially been the case in
telecoms, electricity and gas.
As we have already indicated, the economic significance of these industries is not
limited to the sectors themselves but extends to the whole economy. The back-
ward impact refers to the value added created by those activities that supply
inputs to the network industries. The forward impact refers to the activities that
use the outputs from the network industries. As we have indicated, this includes
virtually all economic activities so that network industries are crucial for the
economy.
The economic reforms were initiated by the EU through a number of directives
that typically prescribed a calendar for the gradual opening up of the markets. In
Belgium this calendar is followed strictly in most cases. In some cases it is accel-Working Paper 1-03
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erated. Only in the case of railway passenger services has the EU n o ty e ts e ta
calendar.
One important aspectofthe reform is theseparation ofinfrastructure from down-
stream activities. Given the economic characteristics of these networks (the
natural monopoly), this is relevant for electricity, gas and railways. In Belgium,
however, the separation is not complete in any of these three industries. In the
cases of electricity and gasalegalseparationhasbeendecided:separatetransport
network operators are created, while the creation of distribution network opera-
tors is under way. The electricity incumbent, however, still has a significant stake
in both network operations and downstream activities, and also in upstream ac-
tivities (electricity generation). In the case of the railways the separation only
involves a separation of accounts.
As regards the phasing, the process of market opening is complete in the case of
telecoms. In gas and electricity, about half of the market is now open. In postal
services and rail freight, significant steps will be taken in early 2003. As regards
the level of competition, significant competition only exists in mobile telecoms
and courier services. In the remaining markets that have been opened up (fixed
telecoms, electricity, gas and rail freight), the incumbent companies still have
dominant or very dominant market positions.
One expected outcome of the market reforms is a positive impact on prices and
quality,whichdetermines the impact onusers (both industrial and domestic)and
on competitiveness. Given the early stage in the opening up of these markets, no
evidence of this can be provided, except in the case of telecoms. Based on harmo-
nised price index data from Eurostat, there has in fact been a 15% fall in prices
since theopening of this market in 1998. Quality has beenimproved,for example,
through the large-scale digitalisation of the network.
Finally, in each of the network industries there are changes associated with the
opening of the market that require specific attention from policy makers. In the
case of telecoms, Belgacom, the incumbent, still has a dominant market position.
It is indicated by the regulator (BIPT/IBPT) as having significant market power,
which implies that price control must take place. Furthermore, agreements are
made for competitors' access to the networks for interconnection, broadband ac-
cess and the unbundling of the local loop. The market regulator therefore still has
significant work to do in order to avoid monopolistic behaviour.
In thecaseofelectricity andgastheincumbentElectrabel,aprivatecompany,also
has averydominantposition.Ithas significantstakesinallsegmentsofbothmar-
kets, including upstream activities (electricity generation). Furthermore, there is
uncertainty about access tariffs for electricity, congested cross-border electricity
transport capacity, and many customers are bound to long-term contracts with
the incumbent. Government attention is therefore required in order to improve
the conditions for the creation of a competitive market.
In the case of the railways there is a separation of accounts, as required by the EU.
This does not, however, guarantee independence between infrastructure and
downstream activities because the incumbent, NMBS/SNCB, has still maintained
its unity. An independent body was therefore created to manage network access,
but efforts are still needed to secure independence when new train operators en-
ter the market. Another serious obstacle is the lack of interoperability with
foreign networks, a problem which must be dealt with at the European level.Working Paper 1-03
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In the case of postal services there do not seem to be any significant obstacles at
present. In the part of the market that has been opened up, sufficient competition
is in place. The incumbent, De Post/La Poste, is modernising its production proc-
ess. Through management contracts with De Post (and also with Belgacom and
NMBS), the State safeguards the public interest by imposing public service obliga-
tions, while compensating for the costs involved.Working Paper 1-03
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Introduction
Network industries have certain features because of which they require special
attention from policy makers. The presence of externalities and natural monopo-
lies may lead to market failures. These features may, themselves, already
necessitate government intervention. Moreover, network industries serve the
public interest because they deliver services that are essential for the functioning
of the economy and they play an important social role. To maintain competitive-
ness and social values, any intervention should, therefore safeguard the public
interest.
In the past, government intervention in network industries has typically meant
the creation of legal or de facto monopolies at the national level, in many cases
state-owned. They haveoperated the networks and deliverednetwork services to
end-users. For several reasons, however, this situation has not proven to be sus-
tainable. It did not fit with the creation of the EU internal market. The absence of
competitive incentives may have led to inefficiencies, and thus to a suboptimal
contribution towards competitiveness. Technological developments have led to
changes in the economic features, and thus in the need for and type of
intervention.
Driven by the EUand in some cases also by national initiatives (such as in the UK),
a process of market reform began in the late 1980s. One basic element of this re-
form is the gradual opening up of the markets, which is currently taking place in
electricity,gas,postalservices andrailways.Fortelecoms,theopeningofthemar-
ket has already been completed, but policy makers still need to devote attention
to this sector. In general, natural monopoly positions, principally in infrastruc-
ture, are regulated in order to secure efficient pricing and fair access. The public
interest is safeguarded through the imposition of universal or public service
obligations.
This paper provides a first analysis of the five network industries mentioned
above in Belgium. It gives an introduction into the concept and economics of net-
work industries, indicates the economic significance of the five industries in
Belgium and gives an analysis of each of the industries separately. This analysis
includes an introduction to the sector structure, legal framework and specific fea-
tures of the industries. Progress in market opening, the incidence of obstacles to
effective competition and current market performance are also analysed.
Chapter I offers a synthesis. It provides a conceptual framework, discusses the
economic significance and performance of the industries and gives an overview
of the current situation in the area of market reform. One advantage of this syn-
thesis (andofthewhole paperaswell)is its horizontal focus.In thepastfewyears
the Federal Planning Bureau has already built up an area of competence in the
analysis of individual network industries. In this paper, the network industriesWorking Paper 1-03
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are put together in a comparative framework. This framework makes it possible
to offer a consistent overview and to provide benchmarking of the network in-
dustries in Belgium. This horizontal framework will be adopted in the future for
other, more specific studies.
Chapters II-VI respectively give more detail on the telecoms, electricity, gas, post-
al and railway sectors in Belgium. The order of the chapters is determined by the
diminishing level of market opening: telecoms is currently the most open and the
railways are the least open of these sectors in Belgium. Each of the five chapters
briefly describes the present structure of the sector and the legal framework. The
current situation with regard to the opening of the market is then discussed, with
the emphasis on obstacles which exist at present. Specific themes such as access
to the network, network interconnection, universal service and public service ob-
ligations are highlighted. Finally, an indication of market performance is given in
terms of developments in prices and quality.Working Paper 1-03
9
I A horizontal analysis for Belgium
A.The analysis network industries
1. Concept and policy issues of network industries
Network industries are industries which activity it is to convey people, products
or information from one place to the other via a physical network of a certain
kind. This includes transport networks (road, rail, etc.), information networks
(mail, telephony) and utility networks (electricity, gas, water). Physically, the net-
work is built up of nodes and links. Nodes are distinguished into entry/exit and
switching nodes. At the entry/exit nodes, flows of people, products or informa-
tion enter or leave the network. At the switching nodes, the flows are switched
into the desired direction.The links,evidently, connect the nodes and may,for ex-
ample, take the form of pipelines, wire, railtrack, and, more abstract, air slots and
postmen’s rides.
Basically,threetypesofeconomicactivityaredistinguishedin network industries
(see Bergman et al., 1998): upstream, infrastructure and downstream activities.
Upstream activities concern the production of core products such as transport
equipment, but also of gas, natural or manufactured, and electricity. Except for
gas extraction (or import) and electricity generation, upstream activities are usu-
ally not considered in the analysis of network industries. Infrastructure activities
involve the development, maintenance and operation of the network itself.
Downstream activities concern the provision of network services to final users.
The precise distinction between infrastructure and downstream activities is not
the same for all network industries. For example, the transmission of electricity is
part of the network operations for electricity, whereas the downstream activities
are limited to purchases and sales. For the railways, however, the running of
trainsispart oftheservice provision, whereas theinfrastructureactivities arelim-
ited to (simply stated) maintenance and traffic control.
It was for long considered expedient that network industries had to be organised
as state-protected, national monopolies. From an economic and social point of
view,networkindustriesindeedhavespecificcharacteristicsthatjustifiedthis be-
lief. Thecharacteristics were considered marketfailures(Ilzkovitzetal.,1999)that
necessitated intervention. This intervention often meant nationalisation of the
whole industry by accommodating all activities into a state monopoly, although
private monopolies also occurred. The most important characteristics are (see
also Bergman et al., 1998; Ilzkovitz et al., 1999; IEI, 1999):
1. Network externalities: Several types of externalities may occur in network
industries. Typical for network industries, however, are the so-called club
and congestion externalities (see IEI, 1999), where the utility of the serviceWorking Paper 1-03
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for one customer depends on the total number of customers. Club exter-
nalities work out positively, for example in the outreach of telecoms net-
works. Congestion externalities work out negatively, for example by
c r o w d e dr o a d sa n dt r a i n s .O t h e re x t e r n a l i t i e s ,s u c ha sn o i s ea n dp o l l u -
tion, also occur, but are not typical for network industries.
2. Natural monopoly: Building up the network infrastructure usually requires
massive investments, whereas the downstream activities have in many
cases relatively low cost. In other words, there are high fixed and low
marginal costs. Fierce economies of scale can be reaped and duplication
of the network or parts of the network is often inefficient. When such a
case applies, infrastructure operations is considered a natural monopoly.
3. Services of general interest: Last but not least, network industries often
serve the public interest, both from an economic and a social perspective.
For production and consumption of goods and services, there is a neces-
sity for the conveyance of persons, products and information. So, well
functioning network industries contribute to economic efficiency and
competitiveness. From a social point of view, certain services of network
industries are considered as basic needs: telephony, Internet, transport,
mail and electricity.
Table 1 gives a typology of network industries according to the occurring exter-
nalities and monopoly elements. It is based on IEI (1999). For simplicity, the
typology is limited to the industries discussed in this paper, see also Section 3 be-
low. IEI also include air transport, local urban transport and water utilities. IEI
distinguishes networks with one-way and networks with two-way traffic. The
latter require more complicated nodes. For further explanation on the terminolo-
gy, the reader is referred to IEI (1999).
TABLE 1 - Main conceptual characteristics of network industries
Source: IEI (1999).
One-way Two-way
























































Substitutes Partial substitution Low substitution Strong substitutionWorking Paper 1-03
11
As regards externalities, it is indicated that club and congestion externalities oc-
cur in almost all cases. Club externalities work directly when the number of
connected people itself is a source for higher utility. They work indirectly when
the number of connected people allow for a widespread availability of network
facilities such as postboxes and bus-stops. Congestion externalities only occur at
fixed capacity levels. They may be solved when investment plans turn out to be
economically and socially feasible. Natural monopoly elements occur in energy
and railway networks, and in water supply, airports and local public transport as
well. Table 1 gives a differentiation by showing that the natural monopoly does
not need to hold for the whole network. It may hold in some segments (links, up-
stream nodes, etc.), whereas it does not hold in other segments.
Anotherimportant elementissubstitutability.Anetworkindustryisnot amarket
in itself, but part of a larger market, where substitution with the products of other
network industries is possible. The most evident example is the railway industry,
which has to compete against other means of transport. For the other network in-
dustries there is (partial) substitution possible as well. Gas and electricity are
substitutes for heating and cooking. Postal services and telecoms are partial sub-
stitutes for certain messages. In a number of cases, one may choose between a
letter, a phone-call, a fax and an email. In other cases, for example for parcels, no
choice is possible.
Although the present paper does not adopt the approach of considering the indi-
vidual network industries as part of a larger market, this phenomenon must be
kept in mind when reading. Because of the more complicated market analysis
and the need for standardised production measures across industries, it is a sub-
ject for specific research. Only in the chapter on railways (Chapter VI), a separate
section is devoted to this phenomenon. It makes use of passenger and tonne kms
as standardised production measures across all means of transport.
As mentioned, it was in the past considered expedient that network industries
had to be organised as state-protected national monopolies, which often implied
nationalisation of the whole industry. In the past two decades, however, the
thought on the economic organisation of network industries has become more
differentiated. Three major reasons are given here. First, because of the inherent
absence of competitive incentives, the monopoly structure often led to inefficien-
cies in production and excessive use of public funds. Second, technological
progress influenced the above characteristics in such a way that the justification
of a monopoly could be questioned. For example, technological progress might
allow forefficientduplicationofnetworks,thereby making the naturalmonopoly
no more existent (see e.g. IEI, 1999). Last but not least, the occurrence of national
monopolieswasnotcompatiblewiththeinternalmarketandthecompetitiveness
of the EU economy. For these reasons it became clear that reform of the network
industries had to be considered. The main aim of the reform was to introduce
open entry and competition where feasible. The reform should also regulate mar-
ket segments where a natural monopoly applies and safeguard the public
interest.Working Paper 1-03
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2. The reform of network industries
a. The European context
The current process of market reform, although justified from a mere national
context as well, was driven by EU initiatives that were taken since the end of the
1980s. Two developments determine this quest for reform: the creation of the in-
ternal market and the Lisbon strategy.
The creation of the internal market is one of the major aims of the Treaty of Rome.
The internal market would contribute to the welfare of and, ultimately, a closer
(peaceful) union among the peoples of Europe. The contribution to welfare was
based on the theories of international trade and economic integration, which
show that an elimination of trade barriers will give a net increase of consumer
and producer surplus in the countries involved (see e.g. Molle, 1990, and Van der
Linden, 1998).
In the creation ofthe internal market, special attention is required for thenetwork
industries. Due to the strong intervention at the national level the EU markets
were patchworks of protected national monopolies. In this constellation consum-
ers were captive to an incumbent and could not purchase from potential, more
efficient suppliers. Partly for this reason, the EU has taken initiatives that led to
the issue of a series of directives since the early 1990s. These directives stipulated
the gradual market opening of most network industries, a process that will at
least last until the end of the present decade. For four of the five network indus-
tries selected for this paper the opening of the market is presently going on. For
the fifth, telecoms, the market has already been opened but account of dominant
market positions of (former) incumbentsandsizableentrantshas still to betaken.
The creation of the internal market is focused on the internal development of the
EU,t h ef o c u so ft h eLisbon strategy is external. The focus of the Lisbon strategy is
on the competitiveness of the EU on the world market. This is voiced by a new
strategic goal, ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and
better jobs and greater social cohesion’.1 This goal includes the completion of the
internal market and the structural reform of markets.
Although it is not explicitly stated in the Conclusions of the Lisbon summit, spe-
cial attention is required for the network industries. It has been mentioned that
network industries serve the public interest. An element of this is the conveyance
of people, products and information. If the conveyance functions efficiently, it
contributes to an efficient production of goods and services, and thus to the com-
petitive economy the EU aims at. Therefore, structural reform is needed to create
European network industries with the least possible number of market distor-
tions. Of course, well functioning markets are not only an element of the Lisbon
strategy, but also another reason behind the issue of the market opening
directives.
Afollow-upofthedirectivesandtheLisbon summit isforeseen.Onecan mention
the initiatives concerning specific sectors: regular reports on the implementation
of the telecommunications package; benchmarking reports on the implementa-
1. Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000, Paragraph 5.Working Paper 1-03
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tion of the internal electricity and gas market; the Community rail market
monitoring scheme.1 Furthermore, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG)
in general and the Cardiff-process in particularlook at the functioning of product
markets, with an emphasis on network industries in bothcases, see e.g. EPC (2002)
and Ministry of Economic Affairs (2002).2
b. Ingredients of the reform
As mentioned, reform was considered to serve the European case, but also to
overcome inefficiencies and adapt to changed (technological) circumstances. The
challenge of this reform is to introduce competitive behaviour while safeguard-
ingthepublicinterestandavoidingmonopolisticbehaviour.Althoughthedesign
ofthereformdifferspercountryandindustry,therearecommonelements,which
are partly prompted by EU regulation. A number of these elements concern the
infrastructure: separation of infrastructure and downstream activities; access to
the infrastructure; interconnection of networks; investments and maintenance.
Other important common elements are: the phasing of the reform; the safeguard-
ing of the public interest; the need for regulation.
-A s r e g a r d s t h e separation of infrastructure and downstream activities it has
been mentioned that there are network industries with a natural monop-
oly for infrastructure or parts of the infrastructure. For downstream activ-
ities a competitive market may then be possible. When there is a
vertically integrated monopolist, however, the downstream activities of
this incumbent company may get a more favourable network access than
those of market entrants. Therefore, the reform aims in many cases for the
creation of an independent network operator by separating the incum-
bent into infrastructure and downstream activities. This separation may
be on an accounting, legal or ownership basis. The latter of these should
normally give the strongest guarantee of independence.
-A s r e g a r d s access to the infrastructure, network operators under a natural
monopoly have monopoly power over the downstream service provid-
ers. To enter the network with their services the downstream service pro-
viders pay an access fee and obtain the right to use the infrastructure
under given conditions. However, under monopoly power the access fee
m a yb et o oh i g h ,a n dt h ec o n d i t i o n sm o r ef a v o u r a b l ef o ro n et h a nf o r
another service provider. The latter may especially be the case when the
network operator also acts as a downstream service provider, which is
often the case for the (former) state monopolies.
-T h e i s s u e o f network interconnection is related to the previous issue. It
applies to cases where the natural monopoly does not hold and several
competing networks may thus exist. This is, for example, the case in tele-
coms. A telecoms network operator must compete to attract end-users.
Once he has attracted his customers, he has monopoly power over other
network operators, when they wish to reach his customers. In that case,
the other operator must have access to his network, and he may exert
market power over that operator. This is the issue of network intercon-
1. See EC (2001b,c, 2002a,c) for recent follow-up reports.
2. The Cardiff-process is initiated at the Cardiff European Council of June 1998. It concerns the
preparation of annual monitoring reports on the reforms of goods, services and capital markets
f o re a c hm e m b e rs t a t e .T h eFPB contributes to the preparation of the Belgian Cardiff report.Working Paper 1-03
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nection.1 IEI (1999) and Laffont & Tirole (2000) give extensive theoretical
analyses of the access and interconnection issues for telecoms.
-T h e investments in and maintenance of infrastructure poses serious questions
for policy makers and market regulators. Optimal investment levels are
required in order to avoid the occurrence of over- or underinvestments.
Social cost-benefit analyses indicate ex ante whether the invested amounts
are to be outweighed by the social benefit. Optimal levels of access prices
are important for an optimal development of the network, taking into
account the social cost-benefit analysis.
- In many cases the reform is phased over a certain number of years.B e r g m a n
et al. (1998) divide the time path into three phases: the first phase is the
initial situation of monopoly; the second is the gradual transfer of
monopoly to competition; the third is the ultimate situation of competi-
tion. So, in the second phase the market is being opened. This is done
gradually to prepare the incumbent, the potential entrants, the customers
and other stakeholders such as trade unions in a gradual way to the new
situation. Bergman et al. state that not all industries may ultimately enter
the third phase.
-T h e safeguarding of the public interest is done by imposing universal or
public service obligations (USO and PSO, respectively). Both are often
entangled, although there is a clear distinction (see Ilzkovitz et al., 1999).
The concept of USO is well defined and relate to minimum service levels
of good quality, available for all citizens and at an affordable price. The
concept of PSO is less accurately defined and has a wider scope than USO.
Public services refer to all cases where government considers market fail-
ures to be such that the private sector alone will not serve the market effi-
ciently (Ilzkovitz et al., 1999). These cases may range from defence and
justice via education and health to network industries. They basically
include the well defined universal services. USO and PSO can be imposed
and financed in several ways. For network industries they may be
imposed on certain companies, either by law or contracts. They may,
however, also be auctioned among interested parties. Financing may be
done by direct government transfers or by funds that are fed by user lev-
ies.
- For all the above elements, a certain level of (new) market regulation is cru-
cial. When the network operator has market power, pricing and access
conditions must be monitored on cost-orientation and equal treatment.
This holds in particular when the network operator also acts as a down-
stream service provider, in other words, when there is no (full) separation
of infrastructure and downstream activities. As argued by Bergman et al.
(1998), during the second phase of market opening there is a trade-off
between industry-specific market regulation and generic antitrust policy.
In the third phase the latter would be sufficient. Also the imposition and
financing of USO and PSO demand for regulation.
Therefore, in virtually all network industries there is an official regulator having
tasks that are specific for the industry and for the stage of market opening the in-
dustry is in. Evidently, the role of this regulator is crucial in shaping the optimal
conditions for the working of the market. To play this role in effectively the regu-
1. Other implications of interconnection are given in e.g. Bergman et al. (1998). The issue is espe-
cially relevant for telecoms. Note that for gas and electricity, the notion of interconnection is used
for cross-border connection between national networks. In this case the issue is rather one of
capacity (assignment) for import and export flows.Working Paper 1-03
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lator must fulfil certain conditions. It must have technical competence on
operationthenetwork.Itmusthavesufficientmeanstocarryoutitstasks.Itmust
have sufficient information. Last but not least, it must be independent. Typical in-
struments in the hands of the regulator are control, licensing, arbitrating and
capacity assignment. These instruments are to be used for ensuring sufficient
competition and equal access, and safeguarding the public interest.
To conclude, network industries have specific economic characteristics that re-
quire government intervention. In the past this often meant the creation of
protected (state) monopolies. Inherent inefficiencies, technological progress and
European integration brought about a process of reform. In this process economic
analysis,bothfundamentaland applied, plays an essentialrole.Itshould provide
government with sufficient input to take balanced decisions.
3. The policy relevance for Belgium
In this report the structure of and latest developments in five Belgian network in-
dustries are described. An important element of this description is the
identification of the obstacles that still exist and prevent an efficient functioning
ofthe industries.Thereportadopts a horizontal approach,which allows fora the-
matic benchmarking of the network industries. For a horizontal approach at the
EU level, see EC (2001a).
The analysis is limited to five industries: telecoms, electricity, gas, postal services
and railways. Other network industries, such as air transport, water transport,
the road network, water supply andlocal publictransport are not considered. For
thefive industries, marketreform is currently atopicofinterest becauseofthe de-
velopments discussed earlier. Technological developments do in some cases
reduce the extent of natural monopoly. This is not the case for water supply,
where the natural monopoly is considered to remain very important. Further-
more,the EUdemands forreforms intheseindustries.Thisis notthecaseforroad,
air and water transport, where the markets are already sufficiently open.1 Finally,
the five sectors basically fall under federal authority2.T h isi sn otth ec a s ef o rl o c a l
public transport, which falls under regional and local authority.
B.Network industries in Belgium
This section gives an overview of five network industries in Belgium: telecoms,
electricity, gas, postal services and railways. The emphasis is on the size and
growth of the sectors, regulation, market opening and market performance. In
five consecutive chapters each of the sectors is dealt with in more detail. These
chapters put more emphasis on the structure of the industries, legislation, com-
petition issues, network access and the public service issue.
1. In these three industries there may, however, still be points of attention for (EU) policy, for exam-
ple in the assignment of slots on major airports.
2. Exceptions are the electricity and gas sectors, which partly fall under regional authority.Working Paper 1-03
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1. Economic significance
The economic significance and growth of the five selected network industries is
indicated in terms of value added and employment. For both, their contribution
to the Belgian total and Belgian growth is shown. Growth is also given in terms
of physical output, which is in principle the purest growth indicator because
there is no ‘noise’ of changes in cost and relative prices. Finally, it is indicated that
the economic significance of network industries goes beyond their own output
and growth: network industries are important for virtually all economic
activities.
a. Direct significance: size and growth of the network industries
Value added created in the five selected network industries constitutes 5.7% of
Belgian GDP, employment constitutes 4.2% of Belgian employment (see Tables 2
and 4, respectively). These shares have remained more or less stable since 1995.
When measured in prices of 1995, however, the value added share increased to
almost 7% in 2001. Contrary to the total Belgian economy, real value added
growth has been stronger than nominal growth. The reasons for this are the rela-
tively favourable price developments in telecoms and electricity, to be discussed
in Section 4 below. Telecom prices showed a more than 10% decrease, electricity
pricesremainedstable.Fortheothernetworkindustries,realvalueaddedgrowth
was below nominal growth.
TABLE 2 - Value added creation of network industries in Belgium (million euro)
Source: INR/ICN (calculation based on national accounts).
TABLE 3 - Real value added growth of network industries in Belgium (1995-2001)
Source: INR/ICN (calculation based on national accounts).
During 1995-2001 the five network industries made a strong contribution to the
Belgian economic growth. The real value added growth of the five industries to-
gether was on average 5.5% per year (38% in six years, see Figure 1), whereas for
real GDP this was only 2.6% (17% in six years). The strong growth was induced by
telecoms and energy, see Table 3 and Figure 1. The growth of the postal services
was of the same order as GDP growth, and value added growth at the railways
stagnated since 1995. In particular telecoms had a strong growth, 11% per year on
average, which implies an almost doubling of value added during six years.
1995 2001 Real growth
Constant prices Current prices (average per year)
Network industries 10,907 15,045 13,455 5.5%
GDP 190,125 222,382 235,816 2.6%
Share in GDP 5.7% 6.8% 5.7%
Telecommunications Electricity & Gas Postal services Railways Total
Average per year 10.7% 4.7% 2.0% -0.1% 5.5%Working Paper 1-03
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FIGURE 1 - Growth of network industries in Belgium (2001, 1995 =100)
Source: INR/ICN (calculation based on national accounts).
In both the total Belgian economy and the network industries, value added
growth was stronger than employment growth, which indicates a growth in la-
bour productivity.1 The difference, however, was significantly more marked in
the network industries, where employment grew only 2% in six years and value
added grew 38%. Just as for value added, telecoms and energy were the principal
contributors.
In 2001, employment in the five network industries was 143,900 persons, see Ta-
ble 4. Thiswas2,200 more than in 1995, which implies a contribution of only 0.7%
to the total Belgian employment growth of 327,000. Only for telecoms there has
been a significant growth, on average 2.2% per year, which is a net growth of
about 650 jobs per year. For the other sectors, employment has remained constant
or has fallen since 1995. These outcomes underline the productivity growth, in
particular in telecoms and energy, where value added growth strongly out-
weighed employment growth. In sum, employment growth of the five industries
togetherwas 0.3%per year,compared to 1.7% for the total Belgian economy.Note
that these employment figures refer to employees only, the self-employed are not
included. In the network industries, however, there are relatively few self-em-
ployed. In the postal sector there may be a few hundred of self-employed
couriers, but his is very small when compared to a total employment of over
50,000. Also in telecoms there may be a number of self-employed.
1. Note that employment is measured here in number of persons. A more precise measurement
would be obtained by applying employment data in terms of hours worked. This is, however,
not available from the given source.
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TABLE 4 - Number of persons employed in the Belgian network industries
Source: INR/ICN (calculation based on national accounts).
FIGURE 2 - Employment shares of the Belgian network industries (2001)
Sources: INR/ICN and Figas (2000, 2001).
The largest sector in terms of employment is the postal sector, with a total of
50,300 persons in 2001. The major part of this is employed at the postal incum-
bent, the remainder at the courier services. Evidently, this is a very labour
intensivesector.Railways and telecoms follow,with each roughly 25% ofthetotal
employment of the five network industries (see also Figure 2). Note that the rail-
way employment includes the construction of railway lines and some smaller
activities of the incumbent that are not related to railway transport proper. Elec-
tricity and gas together constitute the smallest sector in terms of employment.
Because most of the distribution companies are involved in electricity and gas to-
gether,itishardto give separatenumbers.On thebasis ofdisaggregatedindustry
data for 2000 and 2001, however, it may be stated that about 80% of industry em-
ployment can be assigned to electricity and 20% to gas. These approximate
employment shares are applied in Figure 2.
In the above, growth of the network industries was given in terms of output and
employment.Table5gives growth intermsofphysicaloutput.Thisactuallyisthe
purest form of growth measurement as it is plainly based on the number of prod-
ucts made. Only for telecoms there was no adequate data. The data available for




Telecommunications 28,306 28,625 32,202 3,896 2.2%
Electricity & Gas 21,098 20,751 19,430 -1,668 -1.4%
Postal services 50,875 50,339 50,348 -527 -0.2%
Railways 41,419 39,813 41,878 459 0.2%
Total network indus-
tries
141,698 139,528 143,858 2,160 0.3%
Total Belgium 3,138,650 3,259,492 3,465,683 327,033 1.7%
Share in total
employment












this sector referred to number of minutes called, which covers only part of the tel-
ecoms output, and was only given up to 1997. For railways, on the contrary, a
distinction between passengers and freight could be made. Since 1995 the output
of the network industries has grown, see also Figure 3. The growth was especially
strong for gas: on average almost 5% per year between 1995 and 2000. This is fol-
lowed byelectricityand passengers, where the annualgrowth wasabout3%. The
growth of rail freight and domestic postal services has been weakest.1 For postal
services declines are even expected in the future because of the growing use of
electronic transmission of documents. For freight the weak growth implies a fall-
ing market share when compared to other means of overland transport, which
showed much stronger growth rates.
TABLE 5 - Physical output growth of network industries in Belgium and the EU (1995-2000)
Sources: UPU (post), NMBS/SNCB (rail Belgium) and Eurostat (other).
* 1995-1999;
** Limited data availability: domestic items only, EU15 without Austria, Sweden and Finland.
FIGURE 3 - Physical output growth of network industries in Belgium (1995=100)
Sources: UPU (post), NMBS/SNCB (rail Belgium), Eurostat (other).
1. With international mail for Belgium included, annual growth was even lower: 1.1%. For EU15,
however, no data on international mail was available.
Electricity* Gas Postal services** Railways
Passengers Freight
Unit GWh GWh Number of items Passenger km Tonne km
Average per year:
- Belgium 3.4% 4.7% 2.1% 2.8% 1.0%
- EU15 2.2% 4.7% 2.6% 1.7% 3.9%
Belgian share in EU15,
2000





1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Gas Electricity Railways: passengers
Postal services Railways: freightWorking Paper 1-03
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Forthemajorityofnetworkindustriesthe1995-2000growthhasbeenstrongerfor
Belgium than for the EU as a whole. Moreover, the share of Belgium in the net-
work industries at EU level is in most cases larger than the share of the Belgian
economy in the EU. Since the Belgian GDPwas 2.9%of the EU GDP in2000, Belgium
hasalargersharefortwoandanequalshareforathirdnetworkindustry.Forgas,
the high 4.2% share is caused by the fact that there are countries that have hardly
any gas infrastructure, such as Greece and the Scandinavian countries, whereas
in the large countries France and Germany, the share of households connected to
the gas network is lower than in Belgium. Moreover, gas is an increasingly used
primary energy source for electricity production in Belgium. For electricity the
s h a r ei so n l yal i t t l el a r g e rt h a nt h eGDP share, for freight it is equal. Only for pas-
sengers the share is (somewhat) lower because the spatial structure, traffic policy
and consumers’ attitudes are traditionally more car-oriented than in many other
countries.
b. Indirect significance: impact upon other industries
In the above, the economic significance of the network industries was indicated
by theirown sizeandgrowth.In fact,theeconomicsignificanceextendsto alloth-
er activities in the economy. The size and growth of the network industries
themselves is often labelled as the direct impact. The effect upon other activities
is the indirect impact. This indirect impact may run in the backward and forward
direction. This latter distinction refers to the supply of inputs to the network in-
dustries and the use of outputs of the network industries, respectively.
In the backward direction the impact extends to the supply chain of inputs for the
network industries’ products.This includes notonlythesuppliers to thenetwork
industries, but also the suppliers of the suppliers, etc. The backward impact is
measured bythe industries’ ownvalue added plusthe value added created inthe
supply chain. By definition, this is equal to the production value, which is given
in Table 6 and is closely related to industry turnover. However, only part of the
indirect value added is created in Belgium. This is due to the high level of open-
ness of the country. This holds in particular for primary energy sources such as
gas, which are hardly available in the country. Instead, important sources of indi-
rect value added created in Belgium are trade and transport margins and other
services rendered to business.1
TABLE 6 - Production value of network industries in Belgium (million euro)
Source: INR/ICN (calculation based on national accounts).
* Created in Belgium and abroad.
Equally or more important than the backward significance may be the forward
i m p a c t .T h i si sl e s ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r db u tn o ti m p o s s i b l et om e a s u r e .I nt h i sf o r -
1. Besides value added, the backward impact van be measured in terms of employment.
1995 2001 Real growth
(average per year)
Constant prices Current prices
Production value 16,530 28,043 29,597 9.2%
Direct value added 10,907 15,045 13,455 5.5%
Indirect value added* 5,623 12,998 16,142 15.0%Working Paper 1-03
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ward direction, the impact extends to all activities that make use of the network
industries’ outputs. Except maybe for railways the forward impact thus extends
to all economic activities. Efficiently producing network industries serve the
country’s competitiveness and the country’s attractiveness for foreign investors.
At the EU level it was especially for this reason that the Lisbon summit empha-
sised the role of structural reform for competitiveness and growth. It once more
underlines the need for a close monitoring and analysis of network industries,
both quantitatively and qualitatively.
TABLE 7 - Network density in Belgium (2000)
*2 0 0 1
An indicator of the potential of forward impact may be network density, as given
i nT a b l e7 .I ts h o w st h ee x t e n s i o no ft h en a t i o n a ln e t w o r k ,o fc o u r s ew i t h o u ta n y
indication of prices and quality of the services. The Belgian network density, or
penetration, is compared to the EU average. For fixed and mobile telephony the
penetration is behind the EU penetration. However, the number of connections
via the TV-cable is relatively high in Belgium. Also note that, although there are
only 50fixed lines per100inhabitants,virtually all households are connectedtothe
n e t w o r k .T h es a m eh o l d sf o re l e c t r i c i t y ,f o rw h i c hn on u m b e r sa r eg i v e ni nt h et a -
ble. For reasons given earlier in this chapter, penetration of gas connections is
above the EU average. For postal services and railways, finally, the numbers re-
flect the extremely high population density of Belgium. Because of the high
density, less outlets are needed to have a post office nearby for all citizens. Also
because of the high population density a dense railway network is required.
2. Legislation and regulation
Inthe framework ofBergmanet al. (1998),many network industries are in thesec-
ond phase of liberalisation, characterised by a combination of monopoly and
competition. This demands for a kind of legislation and regulation that is very
specific to the respective industries. It is not the purpose of this section to give an
overview of the legislation. For this, the reader is referred to later chapters. Rath-
er, this section will discuss some common elements regarding the regulation of
network industries in Belgium. These are the EU framework, the legislation on
state-owned enterprises, universal and public service obligations, and market
regulation.
Telecommunication networks
Fixed network Mobile network Gas network* Post offices Railway network



















per km² land surface
Density:
- Belgium 51 52 58 135 114
- EU15 56 63 48 - 53 227 47
Source Eurostat Eurostat Figas UPU UICWorking Paper 1-03
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Market opening of network industries is promoted by the EU because it contrib-
utes to the creation of the internal market and the structural reform of the
economy. Therefore, the EU has taken initiatives to open the markets of all five
network industries discussed in this paper. It did so in the form of directives and
recommendations. In EU law, a directive is a legal document that is binding for all
member states, but must be transposed into national law to become effectively
into force. A recommendation is not binding. The directives on market opening
set ultimate dates before which certain steps have to be taken, but member states
h a v et h ef r e e d o mt om o v ee a r l i e r .I nB e l g i u m ,t h eu l t i m a t ed a t ei sa d o p t e di n
most cases, in only a few cases an earlier date was decided on (see also Section 3d
below).
Apart from the obligations that proceed from the EU directives there is an impor-
tant law in Belgium that applies to several state-owned enterprises, including the
telephone,postal andrailway incumbents.It is the 21 March 1991 Act Concerning
the Reform of Specific Public Enterprises. This act lays down the administrative
and legal independence of the incumbents from the Government. It also pre-
scribes the conclusion of management contracts with the Government. These
contracts must be renewed every five years and lay down the rules and condi-
tions under which the incumbent must carry out its PSO. The present set of
contracts covers 2002-2006, although for railways the negotiations are still going
on. Another important element to note is the initiation to establish the regulating
body for post and telecoms, BIPT/IBPT.1 I nt h ec o u r s eo ft h e1 9 9 0 st h ea c tw a s
amended a few times, when this was necessary to become compatible with EU
directives.
As mentioned above there is a distinction between universal and public service
obligations (USO and PSO). USO are often harmonised and prescribed at the EU lev-
el. Typical for network industries are that each citizen should be able to make a
phone call, send and receive letters, light his dwelling, and transport himself.
Hence, there are USO for telecoms, postal services and electricity. For gas and rail-
ways there are generally no USO because there are other means for heating and
transport than gas and trains alone. Examples of universal services outside the
network industries are medical care and basic banking services.
Contrary to many other countries Belgium, and also France, have precise defini-
tions of PSO in their administrative law (Ilzkovitzet al., 1999). For PSO,t he r ei sa l so
a role for the railways and gas sector. For example, the PSO includes a minimum
number of passenger services and network investments for railways, or non-in-
terrupted supply requirements and network investments for gas. For the sectors
that fall under the 21 March 1991 Act, PSO are imposed by this act and the man-
agement contracts mentioned above. The assignment of PSO is not limited to the
incumbent alone. PSO may also be granted to other companies. The management
contracts typically include an annual subsidy for uncovered costs. For the energy
sectors, PSO is imposed by specifically designed law. Payment of uncovered costs
is guaranteed by the establishment of specific funds, which are fed by the users
of gas and electricity.
As mentioned earlier, the second phase of liberalisation requires tailor-made reg-
ulation at industry level, upheld by a specifically assigned market regulator.
1. BIPT= Belgisch Instituut voorPostdiensten en Telecommunicatie (in English: Belgian Institute for
Postal Services and Telecommunications); IBPT = Institut Belge des Services Postaux et des Télé-
communications.Working Paper 1-03
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Typical tasks are monitoring ofmarket power, price control, quality control, secu-
rity control and capacity assignment. For post and telecoms, the BIPT/IBPT is in
charge. For gas and electricity there are regulators at the national and regional
levels. At the national level the CREG regulates the generation and transport of
electricity and the transport and storage of gas.1 At the regional level there are
three regulators for the distribution of electricity and gas, see Chapters III and IV.
For the railways regulatory tasks are still carried out by the Administration and
the incumbent, but proposals for the establishment of an independent regulator
are made.
3. Progress in market opening
Before the gradual market opening started, most network industries in Belgium
were characterised as legal monopolies. For telecoms, postal services and rail-
ways there were state-owned incumbents. These companies had the exclusive
rights to serve their markets, and had close links with the Government. Only for
telecoms there was already some room for establishing public networks by other
companies, though under strict conditions. For energy the structure was some-
what more complicated, but still monopolistic. Generation and transport were in
thehandsofprivateincumbentsfor electricity andgas.Distributionwas(andstill
is) in the hands of some tens of intermunicipal companies owned by municipali-
ties, but in which the electricity incumbent also has a significant stake.2 Each
intermunicipal company basically had the exclusive rights to serve its own area.
Because of the different natures of the five industries, the opening of the market
will ultimately lead to a different structure for each of them. For electricity and
gas there will be independent network operators, both at the national and local
levels.Downstreamactivitiesonlyconsistofsalesandpurchasesinamarketwith
open entry for Belgian and foreign companies. For railways the unity of infra-
structure and downstream activities will be retained, which necessitates the
establishment of an independent body for capacity assignment. The downstream
activities consist of train operations in a market with, for the time being, open en-
try only in freight and cross-border passenger transport.
For post and telecoms there is no need for independent network operators be-
cause, given the prevailing cost conditions, duplication of networks can be done
without loss of efficiency. For telecoms the stage of an effectively competitive
market (the third phase of Bergman et al., 1998) may be reached in the foreseeable
future when the dominance of the incumbent no longer needs the special atten-
tion it requiresnow (seeChapterII).Forpostalservicesthere is competition in the
presently opened segments of the market. This competition will be extended to
the marketfor all itemsabove 50 grammes, and in a later stage for the total sector.
Note that, somewhat paradoxically, more competition at the national level may
be coupled with a higher market concentration at the EU level. From the national
perspective, the opening up of a monopoly may attract entrants and thus invoke
competition. From the EU perspective the removal of the patchwork of national
monopolies may lead to a market with only a limited number of pan-European
1. CREG = Commissie voor de Regulering van de Elektriciteit en het Gas, Comité de Régulation de
l’Electricité et du Gaz, Commission for the Regulation of Electricity and Gas.
2. The incumbent has a stake in the so-called ‘mixed intermunicipals’. The other intermunicipals
are labelled ‘pure intermunicipals’ and fully owned by the participating municipalities.Working Paper 1-03
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suppliers. This process is typically started by national players that seek to extend
their market by strategic alliances or mergers with foreign players. This tendency
may lead to a market concentration at the EUlevel that must be monitored on mo-
nopolistic or oligopolistic behaviour.
Because of the different natures and ultimate aims, it is hard to develop a com-
mon indicator to analyse the present state of market opening at the national level.
In other words, questions as ‘which sector is furthest in market opening?’ and ‘in
which sector is the strongest, or weakest, effective competition?’ are not relevant.
Nevertheless, attempts are made in this section to make a horizontal comparison
the state of market opening in Belgian network industries. This is done by three
qualitative indicators.
First,theseparationofnetworkoperationsfromdownstreamactivitiesisacrucial
condition in some industries. This separation may take place in several stages.
Therefore, the first qualitative indicator shows the stage of separation. Second,
themarket opening is usually phased out over anumber of years. During that pe-
riod, the amount of customers that is effectively free to choose its supplier
increases step-by-step. Therefore, the second indicator shows the proportion of
the market that is opened for competition. Third, the level of effective competi-
tion depends on the market structure after the market opening. Often, the
incumbent remains dominant for a certain period of time. Therefore, the third in-
dicator shows a stylised market structure of the opened segments of the market.
Finally, a brief calendar for further market opening until 2008 is given. This cal-
endar is based on the present EU legislation and its transfer into Belgian law.
a. Independence of network operations
Whenthenetwork infrastructure is considereda natural monopoly,market open-
ing demands for a separation of infrastructure operations from downstream
service provision. Although the precise identification of natural monopolies may
be a subject for detailed research, the infrastructures for electricity, gas and rail-
ways are considered a natural monopoly. In the past this also held for the
telephone network, but due to technical progress duplication is now possible in
an efficient way. To guarantee fair competition in downstream service provision,
the network operator must beindependentfrom any downstream supplier.Ifthere
is no independence the network operator might favour the incumbent at the cost
of the new entrants. In that case the regulator must have appropriate powers to
guarantee equal treatment of entrants.Working Paper 1-03
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FIGURE 4 - Separation of network operations
Source: FPB/BfP.
Thereareseveralstagesofseparatingnetworkoperationsfromdownstreamserv-
ices,each with ahigherlevelofindependence.Forthe Belgian network industries
this is shown in Figure 4. Four stages are distinguished and the opportunity of
competing networks is addressed explicitly.
1. The starting-point is the situation where infrastructure and downstream
services are integrated. This is still the case for the intermunicipals in gas
and electricity. However, the so-called ‘distribution system operators’
(DSO) are being nominated, and separation of sales activities is under
way.
2. The first real stage of separation is separation of accounts, so network
operations and service provision remain activities of the same company.
This is the case for railways, and considered insufficient to create a really
independent network operator. Therefore, the task of capacity assign-
ment (determining which train operators may where and when ride) will
be granted to an independent regulating institution.
3. The next stage is legal separation, where network operations are placed
in a separate entity, but remain at least partly owned by the incumbent.
This is the case for the ‘transport grid’ of gas and electricity. The transport
grid is the network connecting power plants, gas terminals and foreign
networks to the local distribution networks. For the transport grids of gas
and electricity, legally independent ‘transport system operators’ (TSO)
have recently been established.
4. The last stage is the full (legal and economic) independence of the net-
work manager. Without judging whether it is really necessary to reach
this stage, it does presently not occur in the Belgian network industries.
5. Beyond the last stage, the existence of more than one network is possible
where a natural monopoly no longer prevails. In this case, competition
between networks may occur. Such competing networks exist in telecoms
and courier services. For postal services in the reserved area (all items up
to 350 grammes or five times the standard tariff) competing networks are
also feasible, but the whole operation is still exclusively granted to the
postal incumbent.
To conclude, the separation of network operations from service provision is fur-
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respectively. For telecoms and courier services, competing networks exist. Of
course, these competing networks need not be attained by network industries in
which there is a natural monopoly.
b. Level of market opening
The market opening of a network industry is usually phased out over a number
of years. As mentioned before, this is done to prepare the respective stakeholders
in a gradual way to the new situation. For gas and electricity the phasing is based
on consumption level, with large industrial customers being the first, and house-
holds the last to become eligible. For the other industries the phasing is based on
type of service, but still in such a way that large customers are the first to be able
to take advantage of the market opening. For example, for railways it is freight to
become liberalised before passengers. For postal services it was parcels and ex-
press mail to be liberalised before ordinary letters and postcards.
Only for telecoms the market opening has been legally completed. For domestic
passenger train services there are no plans for market opening yet. The other sec-
tors are in intermediate stages. This is shown in Figure 5 where the vertical white
line marks the thresholds between captive and eligible customers as for Decem-
ber2002.Ontheleft sideofthatlineit isindicatedwhichpercentage ofthemarket
is still captive, and in which segments there is still captivity. On the right side the
opened segments are indicated, together with a prudent indicationof the prevail-
ing market structure. The further a bar reaches to the right, the more competition
there is in the downstream market segment.
- As already mentioned the telecoms market is completely opened, so there
is nothing on the left side of the white line.
- In the gas market all customers connected to the transport grid and using
more than 5 million m³ per year are eligible. This already includes 58% of
the market in terms of gas volume, 42% left captive. As will be discussed
in the next section and Chapter IV, however, only a few customers pres-
ently purchase their gas from an entrant.
- In the electricity market all customers using more than 20 gigawatt-hour
(GWh) per year were eligible in 2002. In the Flanders region this threshold
had already been lowered to 1 GWh. Together, this includes 52% of the
market in terms of electricity volume, 48% left captive. However, only a
limited number of eligible customers purchase their electricity from
entrants. As shown by Figure 5, further steps in market opening were
t a k e ni nJ a n u a r y2 0 0 3 .
- For postal services, the eligibility threshold is based on the weight or
price of the item sent. When the weight or t h ep r i c ei sa b o v et h et h r e s h -
old, the customer is free to choose his postal service. In 2002 the thresh-
olds were 350 grammes and five times the standard tariff. In January
2003, they were lowered to 100 grammes and three times the standard
tariff. For Belgium, there is no data on the proportion of the market vol-
ume that is opened, but for the EU as a whole it is very small.
- For railways, finally, eligibility is limited to combined transport and inter-
national co-operatives. Admitted operators may run their trains on spe-
cifically assigned lines and hours. Again there is no data on the
proportion of the market volume that is opened, but for domestic passen-
g e rs e r v i c e st h i si ss u r e l yn i l .Working Paper 1-03
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To conclude, when looking at Figure 5 the sectors are ordered according to a de-
creasing level of market opening: from telecoms via energy and postal services to
railways. A given level of market opening, however, does not necessarily lead to
the switch of a significant amount of customers to the new entrants. In other
words, a given level of market opening doesnot yet guarantee a low level of mar-
ket concentration. Nevertheless, potential competition may induce a dominant
incumbent to exert competitive instead of monopolistic behaviour.
FIGURE 5 - State of market opening in Belgian network industries
Source: FPB/BfP.
* Eligibility threshold as of December 2002.
c. Market structure of opened segments
In an opened market, several market structures may be observed, each with a dif-
ferentlevelofcompetition.FortheBelgian networkindustriesthisisshownatthe
right side of the white line in Figure 5. Four market structures are distinguished,
but, as shown, intermediate forms also show up. The distinction is not so much
based on the market structure in terms of number of suppliers or market concen-
tration. The distinction is rather based on market behaviour in terms of
monopolistic or competitive behaviour. In terms of the structure-conduct-per-
formance model (SCP) the emphasis is more on conduct than on structure.
1. In the least competitive case the incumbent has a near-monopoly. This
means that competitors are very small and very few in number and the
market virtually is a monopoly. This is still the case in most of the Belgian
network industries. In telecoms, a negligible number of lines in the local
loop has been fully ‘unbundled’. The local loop connects homes and
offices with the nearest telephone-exchange. It is a part of the network
that must be passed by most users. In the railway sector there is only one
entrant, offering no more than 4 or 5 trains per week. In the gas sector, as
mentioned, only two customers switched to an entrant. For electricity,
there is somewhat more competition. Note that this refers to the down-
stream activities. For electricity also the upstream activities (electricity
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1. This is not shown in Figure 5.Working Paper 1-03
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owned company also have a near-monopoly, possessing 97% of the mar-
ket.
2 . I nt h es e c o n dc a s e ,t h ei n c u m b e n ti ss t i l ld o m i n a n t ,b u tt h e r ec a nb en o
more talk of a (near-)monopoly. The electricity sector is moving to this
stage. The market share of the entrants was 3% in 2001 and has been
grown during the 2002. In long-distance and international telecoms, there
are already tens of entrants. The market share of the incumbent, however,
is still such that the company got from the regulator the indication as hav-
ing ‘significant market power’ (SMP).
3. The third case is oligopoly. In this case there are few entrants and the
dominance of the incumbent has shrunk significantly. However, there is
still some form of market power. For example, a dominant supplier may
determine prices in a monopolistic way, or there may be cartelisation
among the suppliers.1 In mobile communication the first two conditions
hold but competition among the three operators is fierce. Therefore, this
segment is classified under the fourth case.
4. The final case is the competitive market. This case is best approached for
mobile communications and courier services. As mentioned above, the
three mobile operators show competitive behaviour, although two have
the indication of SMP. Five worldwide operating courier networks serve
about 60% of the Belgian market that is not served by the incumbent. The
remaining 40% is served by a few hundred small courier services.
To conclude, the incumbent companies are dominant in the Belgian network in-
dustries. This is partly caused by the fact that effective market opening, even in
telecoms, is still in its early stages. Furthermore, some incumbents are defending
their historically privileged position, for example by insufficient independence
between infrastructure and downstream activities or by pricing strategies such as
dumping or squeezing. Nevertheless, incumbents have to change their strategy
to make a stand against potential competition.
d. A programme for further market opening
As already introduced in Section 2, the market opening of network industries is
prescribed by EU directives, and transposed into national law. In most cases the
opening takes place on the ultimate dates set by the directives. Figure 6 gives a
stylised calendar for the planned market opening during the next five years. At
the beginning of each bar the eligibility threshold as of December 2002 is given
(see also Figure 5). The step-by-step reductions of these thresholds are then read
rightward until the date of full market opening.
1. In the economic literature, these situations are referred to as ‘Stackelberg behaviour’ and ‘collu-
sion’, respectively.Working Paper 1-03
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FIGURE 6 - Calendar for further market opening in Belgium
Source: FPB/BfP.
For telecoms the market opening is completed so there is no need for discussion
here. For electricity and gas the situation is rather complicated because decisions
have to be taken at two political levels: at the federal level for transport, and at
the level of the three regions for distribution. For postal services and railways the
situation is less complicated. More detail per sector is given below.
- According to a recent agreement in the EU Energy Council the electricity
sector for non-household customers must be opened by 1 July 2004 at the
latest, and for household customers by 1 July 2007. In Belgium market
opening takes place earlier. This holds in particular for Flanders, where
full market opening will already be attained by mid 2003. In Wallonia,
however, the decision for households still has to be taken.
- For gas, basically the same holds as for electricity, both at the EU and Bel-
gian levels, but with differences for Brussels and Wallonia. In both
regions proposals for market opening are made and the EU scheme will
normally be followed. In Wallonia partial market opening will take place
as soon as the proposals are adopted: all power plants and the customers
using more than 1 mio m³. In Brussels, the conditions for opening are not
known yet.
- For postal services a step-by-step reduction of the eligibility threshold to
50 grammes is set by a recent EU directive. The opportunities for a full
market opening in 2009 are being investigated by the EU.AR o y a lD e c r e e
to implement this directive in Belgium has been approved by the Govern-
ment.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Electricity: EU: non-household EU:a l l
Transmission 20 GWh1 0 GWhA l l
Flanders 1 GWh High-tens. All
Brussels 20 GWh1 0 GWh High-tension All
Wallonia 20 GWh1 0 GWh High-tension All (in acc. with EU)
Gas: EU: non-household EU:a l l
Transport 5m i om 3 All
Flanders Power plants 1 mio m3 All
Brussels Proposals exist, but with unknown contents yet All (in acc. with EU)
Wallonia As soon as proposals adopted: Power plants & 1 mio m3 All (in acc. with EU)
Postal
services
350 grs 100 grs (in accordance with EU) 50 grs (in accordance with EU) 0-50 grs?
Rail:
Freight Assigned lines TERFN (in accordance with EU) All? (in acc. EU)?
Passengers None?Working Paper 1-03
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- For railways the only market opening prescribed by the EU concerns
freight traffic. On 15 March 2003 this must take place on a specifically
defined network of main lines, named Trans European Rail Freight Net-
work (TERFN). On 1 January 2008 market opening must be total. The Gov-
ernment is still working on implementing decrees, but it is expected that
the EU calendar will be followed. Decisions on the liberalisation of pas-
senger services will be taken by the EU at a later stage.
To conclude, in most cases the Government follows the final dates set by the EU.
For gas and electricity some earlier dates are set.
4. Performance of the network industries
A basic aim of market reform is the improvement of market performance. When
al e g a lo rde facto monopoly is gradually replaced by a competitive market it is ex-
pected that prices will fall, quality may improve and productivity may increase.
Notethatthelatter effect may imply an initialfall ofemployment.In thelong run,
however, better conditions for growth may be created because of increased com-
petition, and have a positive effect on employment. Another aim, from the EU
point of view, is the creation of an open internal market rather than a patchwork
of nationally segmented markets. This may also increase market performance.
Although it may be too early to isolate the impact of the reform on market per-
formance,thissectiongives abriefoverview oftherecentdevelopments inprices,
quality and productivity. For examples of analytic applications, see Blöndal & Pi-
lat (1997) and ECB (2001).
The evolution of consumer prices for network services is given in Figure 7. These
data come from the Eurostat harmonised indices of consumer prices (HICP)a n d
do therefore not include prices for industrial users. Moreover, the HICP seem to be
based on incumbents’ prices alone and not on entrants’ prices.1 In that case the
prices may be an overestimation of the actual average market prices. The HICP is
the only source available that gives price indicators which are conceptually con-
sistent for all sectors (or correctly stated in the HICP framework: goods and
services) and member states. Data from other sources show (see later chapters)
that the evolution for industrial users is generally similar, although the price lev-
els may be lower.
1. Two examples of this presumption are given. First, in the monthly time series of HICP for tele-
phone and telefax services, Belgacom price reforms are easily traced. Second, the almost per-
fectly horizontal graph for postal services shows the unchanged tariff structure of De Post since
1997. Therefore, it is unlikely that entrants’ prices are already included in the determination of
the price indices.Working Paper 1-03
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FIGURE 7 - Price developments in the Belgian network industries
Source: Eurostat.
* January - September.
Thepriceevolution ofnetwork services has traditionally been strongly controlled
by the Government. This allows for the adoption of pricing policies that serve the
p u b l i ci n t e r e s t .B yd o i n gs o ,g o v e r n m e n tm a ya t t a i n ,f o re x a m p l e ,s o c i a la n de n -
vironmental objectives. The early state of liberalisation has made no change in
this yet. Hence, governmental price control is the major factor behind the evolu-
tion given in Figure 7. The only exception is telecoms. From the 1998 opening of
the marketup to now, there has been anaverage price decrease of 15% for all con-
sumer services. This price decrease was dominated by the incumbent, which had
to make a stand against some tens of market entrants. For electricity, the down-
ward effect of aprice reform was counterbalanced by the upward pressure of fuel
prices. For postal services, no tariff changes occurred between 1997 and Novem-
ber 2002. The price increase for railways (passengers only, where no market
opening has taken place!) has been moderate. The marked changes for gas reflect
the traditional connection to oil prices, but there is also a downward effect of a
price reform.
There are no fundamental differences to the EU average price evolution, see Fig-
ure 8. The only exceptions may be telecoms and postal services. For telecoms the
effect of the market opening seems somewhat weaker than the EU average. This
is, however, caused by the fact that there was a 5% price increase in Belgium in
1997, whereas the EU average already fell almost 3% that year. Since 1997, the EU
average fell by a further 16%, which is about the same as in Belgium during that
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F I G U R E8- P r i c ed e v e l o p m e n t si nt h eB e l g i a nv e r s u sEU15 network industries,
2002* (1996 =100)
Source: Eurostat.
* January - September.
The evolution of quality is not easy to analyse because the quality of a service has
many aspects. Examples of quality measures are the number of faults on the tel-
ephone network, the number of letters delivered the next day and the number of
trains arriving in time. In a recent report( CE, 2002), the European Commission
asked the citizens of the 15 member states how they perceived the quality of PSO.
Questions were asked concerning the quality in general and prices in particular.
Moreover, the Commission wanted to get an idea on how citizens perceived re-
cent changes in quality. For the study, citizens were divided into three groups:
higher social, lower social and ‘sensitive’ groups. For the purposes of the present
paper, two network industries are important: telecoms and electricity.
On the whole, Belgium gets higher marks than the EU average for the two net-
workindustriesfrom nearlyallsocialgroups.All 15memberstatesareputin four
groups, see Table 8. Belgium was classified in the second group. The Commission
points out, however, that Belgian citizens showed a more differentiated picture in
their interviews. In the case of telecoms, for example, Belgian citizens have the
impression that the quality of service is insufficient and that they do not have a
real choice of operator. The market reforms are seldom mentioned by Belgian cit-
izens as of major importance. They indicate that they have the impression that
reforms are hardly noticeable.
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Source: CE (2002).
Theevolution ofproductivity, finally,isgiven in Figure9.This clearlygives acon-
firmation of the picture already given in Figure 1. The strong value added growth
and weak employment growth for telecoms and energy imply an annual produc-
tivity increase of 7% and 8%, respectively. Also for postal services there was an
increase of about 3.5% per year. For railways there was no productivity growth.
Note, however, that employment is measured in number of persons. A more pre-
cise measurement would be obtained by applying employment data in terms of
hours worked. This is, however, not available from the given source.
FIGURE 9 - Labour productivity in the Belgian network industries, measured in
real value added per worker, 2000 (1995=100)














A.The telecommunications sector in Belgium
1. The telecommunications sector1
Telecommunications services are known as carrier services. They include tele-
phoneservices,mobiletelephoneservices,switched dataand leasedlineservices,
Internet and on-line services, and cable TV services. According to EITO (2002), the
carrier services worldwide market value represents 775 billion euro and should
have grown by 6% annually in nominal terms during 2000-2002. The value of the
Western European market reached 217 billion euro in 2000. The most buoyant
segments in Western Europe have been Internet and on-line services (+40% in
2000) and mobile telephony services (+38%). Onthe other hand, the marketvalue
of other telephone services (fixed telephony exclusive from Internet) has de-
creased for the last two years (partly due to price drops).
The trends of the Belgian market are quite similar to those of other Western Euro-
pean countries. For all carrier services, a slowdown of the market growth is
expected for 2002 (4%, whereas growth was still 12% in 2000). As the peak of mo-
bile services growth is now behind us, Internet and on-line services are by far the
most dynamicpart of the market.Figure10 gives a segmentation of the BLEUmar-
ket for 2002.2
FIGURE 10 - Belgium/Luxembourg market segments of carrier services (2002)
Source: EITO (2002).
The share of the producing sector in the Belgian economy is close to the OECD-av-
erage. According to the OECD, telecommunications services have contributed to
1. This section will focus on telecommunications services only and will not include the production of telecommunications equipment
which is usually considered a part of the telecommunications sector.
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2% of the GDP and 1% of total employment in 1997 (last available figure at inter-
national level).
During the second part of the nineties, Belgian telecommunications services have
grown rapidly: between 1995 to 2000, value added has increased by nearly 10%
onaverage per year;during1995-1999, totalreceiptsfromalltelecommunications
services havegrown by 46.2%to 4,822 million euro;the numberoffirms has more
than doubled since 1995 (from 223 to 587 in 2000). The incumbent (Belgacom) still
dominates the entire sector. In 1999, 70% of the sectorial value added was created
by Belgacom and its subsidiaries and 75% of the people employed in telecommu-
nications services worked for Belgacom. Other important firms in the sector are
SWIFT, Mobistar, Telenet, Telindus, Coditel and Global One. Some of these are ac-
tive in cable TV (Telenet, Coditel) or financial data transmission (SWIFT).
The evolution of employment in the Belgian telecommunications services sector
has been different to what was observed in other industrialised countries. Em-
ployment has initially declined in most countries, which was caused by high
productivity gains linked to network digitalisation. In Belgium, employment has
continued to rise at the sectorial level until 1996 even though productivity gains
have also been substantial. Recent figures show that the declining trend has been
reversed in most countries: from 1996 to 2000 and due to the arrival of new oper-
ators, employment in the telecommunications sector has risen significantly in
most European countries. In Belgium, the upward movement has been limited:
the significant increase in 1998 (+2,800) has been partly compensated by a 1999
decrease (-1,200) and the rebound of 2000 is nearly offset by a recent fall.
A striking fact of the telecommunications services sector of the BLEU is the impor-
tance of external trade. According to OECD data for 2000, the BLEU was the third
largest exporter of telecommunications services, with an estimated trade surplus
of 900 million US dollar. Different factors may account for this good performance:
the intensive use of the Belgian network by foreign users, which may be due to
the many international organisations located in Brussels; the development of
ADSL services by firms located in Belgium, such as Alcatell Antwerp; the impor-
tance of the Luxembourg financial market.
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The provision of telecommunications services demands for large investments in
R&D and new infrastructure. As can be seen in Figure 11, the level of investment
in tangible goods carried out by the telecommunications sector has rapidly in-
creased during the nineties. This happened in the most advanced countries such
as the UK,F r a n c ea n dt h eN e t h e r l a n d s .I nB e l g i u m ,t h ei n v e s t m e n tl e v e lh a so n l y
slightly increased, reaching 800 million euro in 1998, which is the most recent
available figure. However, more recent data on the evolution of the infrastructure
could suggest that investments have been much higher since 1999.
2. Sector structure
a. Telecommunications networks
Telecommunications networks are legally defined in Chapter 7 of the 21 March




- other telecommunications networks.
A public telecommunications network is defined as a telecommunications net-
work that is totally or partly used to provide telecommunications services to the
public. The operator of such a network has to obtain a license delivered by the
Minister of Telecommunications, and on the proposal of BIPT.1 The conditions re-
quired to obtain this license are determined by Royal Decree.2 On 1 June 2002, 49
operators held such a licence.
Concerning the network capacity, 424,327 km of optical fibres and 26,620,325 km
of raw copper were installed in Belgium by the end of 2001. Since 1997, the digital
access to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) reaches almost 100%
(99.9%).
The other telecommunications networks cover:
-m o b i l e n e t w o r k s ,
-t r u n k i n g ,
- private radiocommunication networks,
-o t h e r s .
Currently,threeoperatorsare ownerofalicenseto operate amobile network:Bel-
gacom Mobile, Mobistar and Base (KPN-Orange). Two frequency networks are
used:BelgacomMobileandMobistardelivertheirserviceson900 MHzwhileBase
does so on 1800 MHz. Belgacom Mobile is a subsidiary of Belgacom, which owns
75% of the capital. The other 25% belongs to the British operator Vodafone. Mo-
bistar is a subsidiary of France Telecom Mobile, via the Orange group. Since
September 1998, the shares are quoted on the Brussels stock exchange. Base is to-
tally held by the Dutch operator KPN Mobile, which has acquired 50% of the
shares previously held by France Telecom. Since April 2001, the sharing of anten-
1. BIPT = Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications, the market regulator for the
telecommunications sector.
2. Royal Decree of 22 June 1998.Working Paper 1-03
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nas sites to the three operators is imposed by law. This is done in order to
minimise the potential negative effects on public health.
Trunk networks are communication networks via radio. They allow communica-




Vocal telephony is one of the most important telecommunications services and is
mainlybasedon the PSTN analoguenetwork. Interestedcandidates have to obtain
an authorisation from the Minister of Telecommunications that allows the exploi-
tation of a vocal telephone service. The requests are examined by BIPT in function
of the conditions given in the 21 March 1991 Act. These conditions cover, among
others,the economic and technical capacities ofthe candidates. At the end of Sep-
t e m b e r2 0 0 2 ,3 2o p e r a t o r sw e r eo w n e ro fs u c ha na u t h o r i s a t i o n .
Until 2000,the total number ofconnections to the telephone network (PSTN + ISDN
+ coaxial cable) had increased to result in a density slightly above one telephone
connection for two inhabitants.1 Since 2001, the total number of connections de-
creased mainly because of a sharp decrease in the number of PSTN connections.
This could be an indication that mobile telephony is replacing fixed telephony as
a vocal communication tool.
The number of public phone boxes offered across the country also influences the
fixedtelephonymarket share.SinceJanuary 1998,theexploitation of phoneboxes
is free, only a declaration at BIPT is required. By June 2002, 36 declarations had
beenrecordedby theregulator.Attheendof 2001,Belgiumcounted16,736phone
boxes, which is 13% less than a year before.
Since January 1998, services ofvocal telephony may alsobedelivered throughco-
axial cable connections used to transmit radio and TV signals. The number of
these connections is rapidly increasing. Between the second semesters of 2000
and 2001, it showed a growth rate of 37%. At the end of 2001, there were 209,378
connections.
Besides vocal telephony, the other important service offered through the fixed
networkisthedataswitch,includingthedynamicsegmentofInternetaccess.The
access to this market is free, although a declaration at BIPT is needed by kind of
data switch offered. At the end of 2002, 99 Internet services/access providers
were recorded in Belgium, against 76 at the end of 2000 and only 18 at the end of
1998.
At the end of September 2002, the number of active Internet connections reached
1,556,718, which meant an increase of more than 22% in one year. The strongest
increase hadbeenrecorded by broadband and leasedlineconnections, incontrast
1. ISDN =I n t e g r a t e dS e r v i c e sD i g i t a lN e t w o r k .Working Paper 1-03
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to the decline recorded by paid PSTN and ISDN connections. Moreover, at the end
of 2002, 51.9% of the total Internet connections occurred via DSL and TV-cable.1
ThediffusionofInternethas alsobeenencouragedbytheliberalisationofdomain
name registrationsin December2000 and bythe sharp reductionof domainname
prices (from 25 euro to 10 euro) since June 2001.
ii.Mobile networks
The three operators offering vocal services on mobile networks are the same as
the three operators that own a licence to operate a mobile network.
The number of mobile telephony users has rapidly increased in Belgium until
2000, with an annual growth rate of more than 80%. In 2001, the growth rate fell
to 31%, which was due to the high degree of penetration that was reached. Be-
tween June 2000 and June 2001 Belgium improved its position among other EU
member states. It rose from the last position to the 13th place, with 622 users per
1000 inhabitants against a European average of 687 users per 1000 inhabitants. By
June 2002, the penetration rate reached 76%, with a total of 7,881,314 subscribers.
Concerning theservicesoffered,themostimportantgrowthhasbeenrecordedby
data traffic through SMS (Short Message System) applications.
Thelicensing procedureforthethird generation of mobilephones, UMTS (Univer-
sal Mobile Telecommunications System), was launched in 2001. By 15 March
2001, three operators had bought a licence. They paid an entrance fee of 150 mil-
lion euro each. Only Belgacom Mobile paid slightly more. According to the
Belgian license conditions, the three operators had to launch UMTS services by
September 2003. Given difficulties in obtaining the building permits to set up an-
tennas and high cost of investment, however, the Belgian Government has given
an additional year, so the beginning of operations is currently scheduled for Sep-
tember 2004. Meanwhile services based on GSM of the second generation were
continued to be extended.
On most of the modern mobile phones WAP (Wireless Access Protocol) is availa-
ble. WAP allows for the use of rudimentary Internet applications offered on
mobile networks. The development of GPRS (General Packet Radio Services) al-
lowed WAP to be faster and more user-friendly. The I-mode is another service that
allows for Internet surfing on mobile networks, for example for banking opera-
tions and shopping. The two first European countries where this technology is
implemented areGermany (77,000users)and the Netherlands (23,000users).Bel-
gium is the third country. The launching was realised by Base at the end of
October 2002. The MMS (Multimedia Messaging) extends the technology of SMS
with pictures, sounds,photos andvideo clips.Thecommercialisation ofthis serv-
ice started in Belgium at the end of 2002, and at the initiative of Mobistar.
1. DSL = Digital Subscriber Line. This technology includes ADSL (Asynchronous Digital Subscriber
Line) and SDSL (Synchronic Digital Subscriber Line). In a near future, this technology is likely to




The legal framework concerning the opening of the telecommunications market
has been established by European directives on licensing procedures, intercon-
nection and the establishment of a competitive environment (97/13/EC, 97/33/
EC and 97/51/EC, respectively). This general scheme has been specified by the
European directive on the common regulatory framework for electronic commu-
nications networks and services (2002/22/EC)a n ds e v e r a lc o m m i s s i o n
recommendations. Moreover, other European directives or recommendations
treat some specific problems related to the liberalisation of this market: unbun-
dled access to the local loop, universal service, personal data protection and
protection of privacy.1 The most important European decisions are summarised
in Table 11, given in the Annex to this chapter, bottle-necks concerning their im-
plementation are given in Table 12.
b. Belgian level
Belgacom and the Telephone and Telegraph Régie (RTT) have been created by law
in 1930, as publicinterest institutions for the development of telecommunications
infrastructure and services in Belgium.2 The main modification of this act has oc-
curred in the 21 March 1991 Act on public enterprises reform. This act abolishes
RTT, gives Belgacom management autonomy and provides the general frame-
work for opening up the telecommunications market.
The EU directives on market opening were transposed into Belgian law in 1998,
providing for the conditions to create and operate a public telecommunications
network.3 Thisgeneralframeworkhasbeenmodifiedin2000,whenthefollowing
was established:4 unbundling of the local loop and obligations for Belgacom to
publish reference offers concerning this unbundling (BRUO) and binary access
(BROBA). In 2001, the procedure of UMTS license auctioning was fixed.5 A bill on
electronic communications, the transposition of EU directives on telecommunica-
tions into Belgian law, has to be adopted in 2003.
c. Role of the market regulator
The Belgian regulatory authority is the Belgian Institute for Postal Services and
Telecommunications (BIPT) .T h er o l eo fBIPT is defined by the 21 March 1991 Act.
It was established as a parastatal (type A) under the control of the Minister of
Telecommunications.
In order to set up a fully independent regulator, a reform of BIPT was decided in
2002. This reform concentrates on BIPT’s statutory position and organisational
structure. The department in charge of preparing legislation and elaborating
strategy will become part of the Administration. The remaining departments,
1. 2887/2000, 2002/22/EC, 97/66/EC and 2002/58/EC,r e s p e c t i v e l y .
2. Act of 19 July 1930.
3. Royal Decree of 22 June 1998.
4. Royal Decree of 12 December 2000.
5. Royal Decree of 18 January 2001.Working Paper 1-03
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which are in charge of market control and regulation, will constitute an inde-
pendent regulatory body. A proposition has been formally approved by the
Council of Ministers in September 2002, and by Parliament in December 2002.
The role of BIPT consists in promoting the well functioning of the telecommunica-
tions market. To play this role, the 21 March 1991 Act has given BIPT the mission
to indicate operators that have Significant Market Power (SMP) on the following
market: public fixed telephone services and networks, public mobile telephone
services and networks, fixed vocal telephony, leased lines and the national mar-
ket of interconnection. According to the act an operator is judged as having SMP
when it has a 25% or more market share. The tariffs of an operator with SMP are
under the control of BIPT.
One of the most important elements for promoting competition in telecommuni-
cations consists of interconnection conditions. The objective of the legal and
regulatory framework about interconnection is to allow new entrants to connect
their own network to that of the incumbent at competitive prices. BIPT has to con-
trol the annual Belgacom Reference Interconnection Offer (BRIO). Therefore, BIPT
has begun the construction of a bottom-up cost model in collaboration with oper-
ators in 2001. This model is based on the different elements that constitute the
network and is designed to improve the transparency of interconnection tariffs.
The cost oriented principle followed by BIPT has led to substantial declines in the
prices proposed by Belgacom. The bottom-up cost model has been used for the
examination of the BRIO 2003 (sixth edition) at the end of 2002.
On the market of public fixedtelephony services and networks andthe market of
vocal telephony, Belgacom has been declared as having SMP. Therefore, BIPT has
to verify that the prices applied by Belgacom are cost oriented. In order to fulfil
this mission, BIPT has received the external expertise of Bureau Van Dijk. Moreo-
ver, the universal service obligations (USO) imposed on Belgacom include the
respecting of a price-cap mechanism. This price-cap consists of fixing an upper
limit to the price evolution of a basket of services (connection costs, basic sub-
scription,callsfromsubscribers andcallsfrom publicphoneboxes).Thislimit lies
a certain percentage above the annual inflation rate and is fixed by law, usually
for several years.
On the mobile market Belgacom Mobile was judged for the first time as having
SMP (serving more than 25% of the national interconnection market) in October
2000. This SMP status obliges Belgacom Mobile to base its tariffs for call termina-
tion on actual costs, which consequently meant decreases (overall reduction of
morethan20% of the averagelevel ofterminationcharges).SinceDecember 2001,
a price-cap mechanism applies each year until 2004. This price-cap is designed to
reach a total decrease of RPI-46% corresponding to the difference between the tar-
iffs applied at the beginning of 2000 and the lower limit of the margin in which
prices should be fixed, as results from the cost model. For the year 2002, Mobistar,
the second mobile operator, was also declared as having SMP. Obligations in
terms of tariffs, in order to prevent discrimination in interconnection prices be-
tween the operators, still have to be imposed.
Concerning the market of leased lines BIPT has started studying the market in
2001.Fromthisstudy,itappearsthatoutof18declaredoperators,10areeffective-
ly active on the Belgian market. Since December 2002, Belgacom has been judged
as having SMP on all segments of the leased lines market.Working Paper 1-03
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BIPT is also in charge of the management of national numbering. In this field, the
recently allowedportability ofmobilenumbers constitutes an importantprogress
to improve competition between operators. This portability had to be effective by
1 September 2002, but the Minister delayed the implementation because of tech-
nical problems in maintaining the possibility to clearly identify the operator and
telecommunications price for the final user. The portability became effective on 1
October 2002. During the first two months after this introduction, 35,000 users
changed operator.
BIPT also controls the quality and tariffs of carrier preselect service providers.
These controlshave led toan average price reduction of 28% during2002. Finally,
BIPT has the mission of promoting informatics’ security at the national level. The
E-Security Team is the BIPT department in charge of monitoring and alerting for
virus attacks.
4. Progress in market opening
a. Entry, competition and market share
The opening of the market was closely connected to the substantial regulatory
and institutional re-organisation of communication markets. The interaction of
and feedback effects betweentechnological progress and regulatory reformin the
communication sector has influenced the behaviour of market players and creat-
ed markets for new services (Internet services for example).
Since the formal opening of most telecommunications markets in 1998, the
number of other licensed operators (OLO) has rapidly increased on public fixed
network and vocal telephony markets. This evolution has occurred even though
the telecommunications industry has experienced a worldwide slowdown.
TABLE 9 - Number of telecommunications operators
Sources: BIPT (2001, 2002) and CCT (2002).
However, the rapid increase in the number of operators is not necessary synony-
moustoan increaseincompetition andmayhidesituationsthatareverydifferent
according to the kind of service market considered. In striking contrast to the
long-distance and international telecommunications markets, the market entry in
the local markets has not substantially reduced the incumbents’ market share in
OECD countries, with the exception of Canada and the UK. The entrants’ share of
local access lines remain minor, even in the many countries at the forefront of
market liberalisation (the USA and Finland for example). The reason for the in-
cumbents’ dominance in the local market is clearly not the lack of market
entrants, but the strategic behaviour of the incumbent operators concerning ac-
12/1998 12/1999 12/2000 12/2001 9/2002
Public network operators 15 27 39 46 48
Vocal telephony operators 15 21 33 31 32
Leased lines operators 7 13 25 27 n.a.
Mobile telephony operators 2 3 3 3 3Working Paper 1-03
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cess charges. Indeed, the incumbent may set access charges for its network such
thatthe OLOs’marginswiththeend-usertariffsaresosmallthatitisnotprofitable
to provide services through the incumbent’s network. This is the prize squeeze
strategy. This strategy shows that local loop unbundling (LLU)i t s e l fi sn o ts u f f i -
c i e n tt oc r e a t ee f f e c t i v ec o m p e t i t i o n .M o r e o v e r ,t h ei n c u m b e n t su s u a l l yr e s p o n d
to the market entry by increasing their efforts to enlarge their customer base
(through non-price strategies such as advertising). Given the high customer loy-
alty on this market and the network effects, this is a sensible strategy to deter
profitable entry even in new markets such as mobile telephony. Therefore, policy
actions are necessary to promote effective competition.
According to BIPT, 100% of the Belgian population had the choice between 2 op-
erators and 40% between three to five operators for national communication in
2001. This put Belgium at the tenth position in the EU, far behind Denmark, Swe-
den, the UK, Ireland, Portugal and Austria where 100% of the population had the
choice between more than five operators. Concerning international communica-
tion, 40% of the Belgian population had the choice between more than five
operators and everyone between at least three operators. This also means a low
position since twelve countries of the EU offered a choice between more than five
operators to their citizens. The SMP portion of Belgacom on vocal telephony is il-
lustrated by its share in market turnover (see Table 10).
TABLE 10 - Vocal telephony market shares based on turnover (end of year)
Source: BIPT (2003).
* June.
Figures on market shares are available for the mobile telephony market and are
presented in Figure 12. The dominant position of Belgacom on the mobile teleph-
ony market is progressively eroded by the two other operators while the market
is rapidly developing. Between 1999 and 2002, the market share of Belgacom de-
creased from 65% to 53% while the number of users has more than doubled. The
n e wu s e r sa r em o r el i k e l yt oc h o o s ef o rt h en e wo p e r a t o r s .
1999 2000 2001 2002*
Total vocal telephony:
- OLOs 4.3% 13.1% 19.1% 21.5%
- Belgacom 95.7% 86.9% 80.8% 78.5%
National vocal telephony:
- OLOs 2.5% 7.6% 13.9% 15.7%
- Belgacom 97.5% 92.4% 86.1% 84.3%
International vocal telephony:
- OLOs 10.5% 28.2% 34.3% 38.4%
- Belgacom 89.5% 71.8% 65.7% 61.6%Working Paper 1-03
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FIGURE 12 - Market shares of mobile operators
Sources: BIPT (2003).
b. The unbundling of the local loop and binary access
The local loop is the bottleneck of the fixed network that telecommunications ser-
vice providers need to pass in order to reach their customers from other fixed
networks. Local loop unbundling (LLU) is of utmost importance to effective com-
petition, especially for local call operations in vocal telephony. In Belgium and
other industrialised countries, the implementation of LLU has been slow. In 2001
Belgacom was for the first time legally obliged to publish its reference offer for
theunbundling of thelocal loop (BRUO2001).1 This BRUO was published on 31 De-
cember 2000. Two months later, on 28 February 2001, the Minister of
Telecommunications approved the judgement of BIPT that obliged Belgacom to
modify its offer. Harsh negotiations about the conditions of the BRUO took place
between Belgacom and the OLOs. The first ministerial notice was followed by oth-
ers designed to determine some specific tariffs.2 A tt h es a m et i m e ,BIPT decided to
create working groups with all market participants in other to identify the main
obstacles that prevent an effective unbundling of the local loop. The high cost of
collocation charged by Belgacom and the delay in providing effective lines rapid-
ly appeared as the main obstacles. Consequently, on 27 July 2001, BIPT imposed
co-mingling to Belgacom as a solution to the collocation problem.3 On 9 April
2002, BIPT published the formal approval of the BRUO 2002. The new offer (BRUO
2003) is currently beinganalysed by BIPT. Atthe end of 2002, only2,005 lines have
been fully unbundled, and for 1,632 there is offer shared access.
Broadband connections are diffusing rapidly. They can be based on DSL lines or
through cable television infrastructure.4 At themoment, it is mainly used for data
transmission, but in the future it could be used more and more as support for vo-
1. BRUO = Belgacom Reference Unbundling Offer.
2. On 13 March concerning the tariffs of raw copper, on 27 April concerning the tariffs of shared
access and on 31 May concerning the tariffs of blocs, tie-cables and splitters.
3. Co-mingling offers the operators the possibility to install their racks in the same place where Bel-
gacom installs its equipment and not in a distinct space (as is the case for collocation).
4. It should be noted that the cable TV network (especially as regards coaxial cables) is a less per-
forming infrastructure. Due to the bus technology used, the speed of transmission will decrease
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cal telephony. Effective competition on broadband DSL services also demands for
access to fully unbundled lines. On 16 January 2001, Belgacom published its
wholesale offer concerning bitstream access (BROBA 2001) as scheduled by a 1998
royal decree.1 This offer was judged insufficient by BIPT and, following a formal
demand, Belgacom published a modified version of the BROBA on 3 July 2001.
This new version has been modified several times by ministerial decisions in or-
der to improve the competitive conditions of this segment of the market, in
particular in terms of tariffs. However, the OLO complain about the reluctance of
Belgacom to effectively apply the conditions scheduled in the BROBA.A f t e rh a r s h
negotiations with Belgacom, the BROBA 2002 was approved by BIPT on 9 April
2002. At the end on 2002, BIPT received the BROBA 2003 for advice. However, the
effective competitive access to this market segment seems to remain difficult and
figures published at the end of June 2002 by the European Competitive Telecom-
munications Association (ECTA, 2002) showed that only 1,000 DSL lines out of a
total of 363,000 were fully unbundled and operated by competitive local ex-
change carriers. The lack of competition on the DSL market is partly
counterbalanced by the services provided by cable operators. Some of them al-
ready offer broadband access. In June 2002, around 280,000 cable Internet
broadband connections have been registered. Broadband lines represented 15%
of the total number of lines in Belgium, which was significantly higher than the
EU average of 4%. In December 2002, 330,931 cable Internet broadband connec-
tions have been registered.
As a major alternative for bridging the last mile, the setting up of wireless access
could greatly contribute towards opening up the market to new operators. This
alternative technology has received different names: Fixed Wireless Access, Wire-
lessLocalLoop(WLL) orBroadband WirelessAccess. In 2001, six nationallicences
were attributed for different frequencies spectra. However, at the end of 2001, the
interest manifested by operators had rapidly declined because of difficulties in fi-
nancing the project and the frequency fees that made WLL an unattractive
alternative for leased lines. Consequently, at the end of 2001, only 61 connections
were realized via Fixed Wireless Access.
B.Specific topics concerning telecommunications
1. Universal service, access, and public interest
The public service of telecommunications includes three elements: the universal
service, the universal access and some missions of public interest.
The principle of universal service is that everyone, regardless of income and ge-
ographical location, has access to an affordable telephone service. This service in
Belgium includes the following elements as defined in the 21 March 1991Act:
- access to the basic public fixed network everywhere on the national terri-
tory;
- free emergency calls;
- help service for subscribers;
1. It has to be noticed that Belgacom has an ADSL retail offer since April 1999; BROBA =B e l g a c o m
Reference Offer for Bitstream Access, which includes two parts: BROBA I concerning the leased
capacity and BROBA II concerning the access line; Royal Decree of 22 June 1998.Working Paper 1-03
46
- information service for subscribers;
- possibility to receive calls and to call emergency services even in case of
non-paid bills;
- supply and maintenance of public phone boxes;
- publication of a universal directory in areas where there is not such a
directory;
- supply of basic vocal telephony services at a price affordable for persons
in financial difficulties.
The Belgian universal service does not include the mobile telephony. The BIPT an-
nuallypublishesa report concerning therespectbytheincumbentoperatorofthe
universalserviceobligations(USO).TheperformanceofBelgacom isevaluatedfor
each obligation imposed by the law. The law also provides for the financing of
USO through a specific fund. In 2002 Belgacom asked for the activation of this
fund and this demand is currently examined by BIPT as well as the practical mo-
dalities of the contribution to this fund. The legal framework of USO has to be
adapted to the European legislation, in particular in order to open the universal
service offer to competition and to extend it to mobile telephony.1
The principle of general access imposes the availability of some specific services
everywhere on the national territory. A Royal Decree defines these specific serv-
ices: for example leased lines, data commutation service, ISDN access, telex and
telegraphy services.
General interest missions are also organized by a management contract between
theBelgian authorities andBelgacomas scheduledbylaw.2 This contractfixesthe
general interest missions: the collaboration of Belgacom with the civil defence
and the mixed telecommunications commission; the supply of Internet connec-
tions to schools, libraries and hospitals at affordable prices. In addition, the act
opens the possibility to OLO to participate in these general interest missions. The
management contract also contains the budget allocated by the State to Belgacom
in order to fulfil these missions.
2. Welfare effects
a. Prices
The liberalisation of the market and the progressive increase in competition has
generally allowed a decrease in prices for final users, as illustrated by Figure 13.3
However, although prices of national and international calls on the fixednetwork
have sufficiently decreased to improve the Belgian position inside the EU (fifth
position among the cheapest countries), the price of local calls increased in 2001,
thus staying among the highest of the EU (see Figure 14).
1. Directive 2002/22/CE.
2. Act of 22 June 1998.
3. As these consumer prices continue to be measured on the basis of incumbent prices, they do not
reflect the most attractive conditions offered by the market.Working Paper 1-03
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FIGURE 13 - Prices of local, national and international calls in Belgium (1997=100)
Source: Eurostat.
In 2001, the price of a local call in Belgium (0.54 euro) was 32% higher than the
average price for the EU (0.41 euro). Since 1997, this gap has even increased, re-
flecting the difficulties to establish effective competition on the local loop, as
already mentioned.
FIGURE 14 - International comparison of telecommunications prices (2001)
Source: Eurostat.
The Eurostat structural indicators do not contain information on prices of mobile
calls. Information on these tariffs is published by the OECD (2002a) and shows the
relatively favourable position of Belgium with prices lower than the average EU
prices.1
The cost of data switch in Belgium is quite difficult to evaluate and to compare to
other countries given the multiplicity of different offers for basic and broadband
connections. For 2002, however, a general decline of tariffs applied by the main
providers of Internet access via DSL connections has occurred, which boosted the
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1. Currently, the most recent year available is 2000.Working Paper 1-03
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b. Quality
Compared to other countries in Europe, Belgium has a middle-sized fixed teleph-
ony infrastructure. During the past few years the incumbent, Belgacom, has put
a huge effort in digitising a significant part of the network. In the area of new
communication technology infrastructure, Belgium is performing well: mobile
telephony is important and the network is for the major part digitised; cable in-
frastructure is widely implemented; Belgium has a relatively dense network of
optical fibres (424,327 km at the end of 2001).
Indicators on the quality of services provided by Belgacom in the area of the USO
are available in BIPT reports. However, these indicators are estimated by Belga-
com itself, without systematic independent controls.
C.Annex
TABLE 11 - European regulation on telecommunications since 1997
European Regulation Subject Problems in transposition into
Belgian law
Directive 97/13/EC Common framework for general authorisations and individual
licences in the field of telecommunications services
Directive 97/33/EC Interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring
universal service and interoperability through applications of the
principles of open network provision
Non conformity




Directive 97/66/EC Processing of personal data and protection of privacy in the tele-
communications sector
Directive 98/13/EC Telecommunications terminal equipment and satellite earth station
equipment
Directive 98/10/EC Application of open network provision to voice telephony and uni-
versal service for telecommunications





Interconnection/accounting separation and cost accounting
Directive 98/61/EC (amending 97/
33/EC)
Operator number portability and carrier preselection
















Directive 2002/22/EC Universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communi-
cations networks and servicesWorking Paper 1-03
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TABLE 12 - Main problems encountered in Belgium in the implementation of the telecommunications regula-
tory package
Sources: BIPT and EC (2001c).
Directive 2002/21/EC Common regulatory framework for electronic communications net-
works and services
Directive 2002/20/EC Authorisation of electronic communications networks and serv-
ices
Directive 2002/19/EC Access to and interconnection of electronic communications net-
works and associated facilities
Decision Establishing the European Regulators Group for Electronic com-
munications networks and services
Directive 2002/58/EC Processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the
electronic communications sector
Main issues Problems Measures taken or expected
National regulatory authority Lack of independence of BIPT
Too heavy procedures of the interconnection chamber
Lack of power to enforce decisions upon the incumbent
Setting up of an independent body to deal
with matters such as interconnection and
LLU
Licensing Too high frequency fees for the WLL
Uncertainty regarding the issue of a 4th licence in UMTS
Stop given to the building permits to set up antennas
New tariffs introduced in 2002
Local access competition,
including implementation of
the regulation on local loop
unbundling and bitstream
access
Although Belgium is one of the cheapest countries for
unbundled lines, many problems appear for the LLU: quality
of lines provided by Belgacom, time needed for provision,
end-user tariffs of the incumbent.
Too high costs for collocation
Insufficient viable margins for new operators willing to offer
ADSL services (technical restrictions and tariffs offered by
Belgacom)
Improvements for collocation and co-min-
gling
Tariffs Level of retail tariffs of Belgacom and absence of an ex ante
price squeeze test by BIPT
Cost accounting Entrants regret the delays and the lack of transparency in
the use of the cost accounting model by BIPT
Leased lines Tariffs for international leased lines are above the EU aver-
age
Rights of way Major bottleneck
Regions and other entities ask for rights of way permit and
fees which is not permitted by federal law
European Regulation Subject Problems in transposition into




A.The electricity sector in Belgium
1. Sector structure
a. Structure of the electricity sector
The electricity sector is split into three segments: generation, network operations
and sales. There is a dominant private incumbent, Electrabel, active in all seg-
ments of the electricity market, but also in the gas market (see the next Chapter).
The recent reforms of the electricity sector did not result in a radical re-structur-
ing.Inparticular,thesereformswerenotaimedatbreakingupthegenerationand
distribution activities of the incumbent as was done in England and Italy. They
focused on market regulation to ensure fair competition in production and sup-
plyandonthelegalunbundlingofnetworkoperationsfromproductionandsales
activities.
Electricity production is dominated by two electric utilities: the private company
Electrabel with a share of 91% and the public company SPE with a share of 6.5%
of total electricity generation in 2000. Autonomous electricity producers and in-
dustrial autoproducers represent less than 3%. Moreover, in 1995, Electrabel and
SPE created a new company, called CPTE, to co-ordinate and manage their activi-
ties in electricity generation and transport. With a production share of 58% in
2001, nuclear power is the main source of net electricity production. The second
most important source is natural gas (21%), followed by coal (13%). Renewable
energy sources amount to less than 3%.
Network operations are separated into:
- transport: networks with a voltage higher than 70kV;
- distribution: distribution and local transport networks with a maximum
voltage of 70 kV.
Further to the legal provisions in the 1999 Electricity Act (see Section 2b below),
the transport of electricity becomes a legal monopoly and must be legally separat-
ed and become independent from production and supply. To comply with the
law, CPTE – the only candidate for the nomination of transport system operator
(TSO) – created a subsidiary for its network operations. This subsidiary, called
ELIA, was established in June 2001. 30% of the shares were sold to Publi-T (a hold-
ing of Belgian municipalities) and 40% will later be sold on the stock market. In
September 2002, the government nominated ELIA System Operator as indepen-
dent TSO.1
1. Official Journal of 17 September 2002.Working Paper 1-03
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The municipalities own the distribution network. This network is managed by 8
municipal utilities, 8 pure intermunicipal companies, and 16 mixed intermunici-
pal companies. The major difference between the three groups is that the latter
organise and manage their distribution activities in association with Electrabel.1
Similarly to transport, distribution system operations (DSO) will be legally sepa-
ratedfrom sales activities.InFlanders,theshare ofprivateshareholdersis limited
to 30% and in Wallonia to 49%. The legal unbundling of DSOsi su n d e rw a yw i t h
the appointment, in September 2002, of most DSOs in Flanders and Wallonia. The
latter are the current (inter)municipal companies.
In 2000, 35 companies ensured the electricity sales to final consumers: 3 private
companies and the 32 municipal and intermunicipal distribution companies (see
above). In this segment, the direct market share of Electrabel is slightly less than
40%. However, Electrabel also has an indirect market share through its participa-
tion in the mixed intermunicipal companies, who represent some 80% of
electricity sales to public distribution.2
With the further opening-up of the electricity market, the above picture of elec-
tricity supply is changing: sales to eligible customers are in the hands of licensed
suppliers, whereas sales to captive customers are still ensured by the (inter)mu-
nicipal companies. At the moment, about 15 companies have a licence to sell
electricity to eligible customers. In Flanders, five pure intermunicipal companies
have transferred their electricity and gas sales activities into a new commercial
company, called Luminus.3 In Wallonia, three pure intermunicipal companies
have created ALE-trading for their sales activities.4 Moreover, sales activities for
the non-captive segment of the market, which were previously operated by
mixed intermunicipal companies, came in the hands of Electrabel Customer So-
lutions (ECS), a subsidiary of Electrabel, in which the municipalities took a
minority interest.
b. Key figures about the incumbent (Electrabel)
Electrabel is a European company. It is the market leader in Benelux and a major
energy company in Europe. The company is quoted on the stock market. The
leading shareholder is Tractebel (43.99%), which is the energy branch of the
FrenchcompanySuez.Theremainingsharesareallocatedbetweenthestockmar-
ket (51.34%) and the municipalities (4.67%). Electrabel is organised according to
four core activities: electricity generation; building, management and mainte-
nance of electricity and natural gas networks; electricity and natural gas trading;
sales of electricity, natural gas and derived energy products and services.
The strategy of Electrabel focuses on competitive pricing and quality and on the
furtherdevelopmentofthecompanyinEurope whilst remainingtheleader inthe
Benelux. In Belgium, Electrabel has a dominant position in electricity generation
and sales to direct customers. It is also a key player in natural gas trading.
Through its 100% subsidiary ECS and its participation in the mixed intermunici-
pals, it is active in electricity and gas sales to the ‘distribution’ customers.
Through its participation in several DSOs, it is active in network management.
1. Electrabel has an average share of 60% in the mixed intermunicipal companies.
2. Electricity sales to public distribution represent about 63% of total sales.
3. IVEG, PBE, VEM, WVEM and Interelectra.




The main EU legislative framework at the basis of the reform of the Belgian elec-
tricity sector is Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal
market in electricity.1 The directive introduces competition in the European elec-
tricity industry and establishes common systems for the generation, transmission
and distribution of electricity. It lays down the rules relating to the organisation
and functioning of the electricity sector (separate accounts for generation, trans-
mission and distribution activities; reciprocity clauses; time schedule of the
market opening), access to the electricity network (negotiated or regulated third
party access, or single buyer), and the criteria and procedures for granting au-
thorisations for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity.
With the aim of speeding up the liberalisation of the electricity market and inte-
grating other policy objectives (security of energy supply; consumer protection),
the European Energy Council approved the draft of a new directive on 25 No-
vember 2002.2 The key elements of this draft are:
- a faster time schedule for the full opening of the electricity market (full
competition by 1 July 2007);
- legal unbundling between network management and production and
sales activities;
- regulated and published access tariffs;
- establishment of an independent regulatory body3;
- additional measures regarding the security of energy supply and public
service obligations (PSO).
Finally, other EU legislation adopted or in preparation will have an impact on the
generation of electricity in Belgium. For instance, Directive 2001/77/EC on the
promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal
electricity market contains an indicative objective for Belgium that 6% of total
electricity consumption should be produced from renewable energy sources in
2010.4 Furthermore, there is a proposal for a directive on the promotion of cogen-
eration based on a useful heat demand in the internal electricity market, which
creates asupportingandfacilitating frameworkfor the developmentofcogenera-
tion in EU countries.5
b. Belgian level
T h et r a n s p o s i t i o no fD i r e c t i v e9 6 / 9 2 / EC into Belgian law implies the adoption of
federal and regional legislation. The federal legislative and administrative provi-
sions focus on those aspects of the directive that are of federal competence,
namely the production andtransport ofelectricity,tariffs,longterm planningand
competition issues. The regional legislative and administrative provisions deal
1. Official Journal L 27 of 30 January 1997.
2. Based on COM(2002)304 final of 7 June 2002: Amended proposal for a Directive amending Direc-
tives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC and for a regulation on conditions for access to the network for
cross-border exchanges in electricity.
3. Independent of the interests of the electricity industry and of politics.
4. Official Journal L 283 of 27 October 2001.
5. COM(2002)415 final of 22 July 2002).Working Paper 1-03
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essentially with the distribution of electricity, the rational use of energy and
renewables.
At the federal level, Belgium has implemented the directive through primary leg-
islation by the 1999 Electricity Act.1 In July 2001, a new act has been adopted that
c o m p l e t e da n da m e n d e ds o m ep r o v i s i o n so ft h e1 9 9 9A c t . 2 Secondary legislation
is almost completed. For instance, Belgium hasadopted major decrees of applica-
tion, notably relating to the nomination of the TSO, the general structure of
transport tariffs and the technical rules for the management of the electricity
transport network (grid code).
At the regional level, the Decrees relating to the organisation of the electricity
market were approved in July 2000 for the Flemish region and in April 2001 for
the Walloon region.3 As for the region of Brussels-Capital, the Council of Brus-
sels-Capital approved the order on the liberalisation of the electricity market in
July 2001.4 The adoption of secondary legislation (implementing decrees) is pro-
gressing steadily but at a different pace according to the regions (see Section 3
below). Several decrees deal most particularly with renewable energy sources
and cogeneration by setting up of systems of green and heat certificates.
c. Role of the State and the market regulators
The role of the federal Government relates mainly to procedures for the invest-
ments in transport and generation of electricity and to the setting of tariffs. More
specifically,theMinistryofEnergyisresponsibleforgranting,onthebasisofpro-
posals by the regulator, of licences for electricity generation, transport and
supply. It also nominates the TSO. The Ministry of Economic Affairs fixes maxi-
mum prices for electricity sold to captive customers. The 1999 Electricity Act also
gives the possibility to the Ministry of Economic Affairs to fix maximum prices
for electricity supply to eligible consumers, but no decision has been taken yet on
this issue.
Belgium has five bodies in charge of the regulation and control of the electricity
market: four regulators for the opened segments of the market (one at the federal
level and three at the regional level), and the Control Committee for Electricity
and Gas (CCEG) for the captive segments of the market.
At the federal level, the Commission for the Regulation of Electricity and Gas
(CREG) was established in January 2000. The CREG has both an advisory, monitor-
ing and controlling role. It approves the tariffs for access to the network,
establishes an indicative plan of power production means for the next ten years,
controls the application of laws and regulations and is also the dispute settlement
authority. The members of the Board of Directors are not allowed to have any di-
rect or indirect interest in the electricity industry. The CCEG is still competent for
the regulation of electricity prices to non-eligible customers. Nevertheless, in De-
cember 2001 the Council of Ministers decided to transfer the competencies of
CCEG to CREG by 1 July 2003.
1. Official Journal of 11 May 1999.
2. Official Journal of 20 July 2001.
3. Official Journal of 22 September 2000 and 1 May 2001, respectively.
4. Official Journal of 17 November 2001.Working Paper 1-03
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In the Flemish and Walloon Regions, regulators were also set up with similar re-
sponsibilities as thosedevotedto CREG: VREGinFlanders,and CWaPEin Wallonia.1
Theregion ofBrussels-capital has no specificregulatoryauthority.Theenergy de-
partment of the Brussels Institute for the Environment (BIM/IBGE)f u l f i l st h et a s k s
oftheregulator.2 Theregionalregulatorsarealsoresponsibleforthe management
of the systems of green certificates, set up to promote renewable energy sources
and of measures to encourage the rational use of energy.
3. Progress in market opening
A c c o r d i n gt op r e s e n tl e g i s l a t i v ep r o v i s i o n s ,t h et i m es c h e d u l ef o rt h eo p e n i n g - u p
of the electricity market is summarised in Table 13.
TABLE 13 - Eligibility thresholds for electricity in Belgium
Source: FPB/BfP.
* Eligibility also applicable to consumers consuming more than 1 GWh per year.
** It is worth underlying that the definition of high-tension client varies according to regions.
*** In fact, eligibility applies to consumers consuming more than 9 GWh per year.
Thus, in2002, allconsumers consumingmore than 20 GWh annually and connect-
ed to the national transport network or to the distribution networks of Wallonia
and the region of Brussels-Capital are free to choose their supplier. The eligibility
threshold is lower for the final consumers connected to the distribution network
in Flanders, where it is fixed at 1 GWh since January 2002.
Theabovetimescheduletranslates intothefollowingtheoreticalmarketopening:
35% of total electricity demand in 2000, 42% in 2001 and 52% in 2002. However,
in practice, only a small percentage of eligible customers have switched between
suppliers: in 2000, customers having switched represented no more than 1% of
the total electricity demand; in 2001, this percentage rose to 3% (or 8% of total
electricity supplied to the eligible customers). The new entrants are foreign elec-
tric utilities or energy trading companies.
1. VREG = Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt (in English: Flemish
Regulating Body for the Electricity and Gas Markets; CWaPE = Commission Wallonne pour
l’Energie (in English: Walloon Energy Commission)
2. BIM = (Brussels Instituut voor Milieubeheer); IBGE = (Institut Bruxellois pour la Gestion de l'Envi-
ronnement).
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As Table 13 shows, the opening-up of the electricity market is progressing faster
in Flanders than elsewhere in Belgium. About 60% of total electricity consump-
tion in Flanders is now eligible and the market share of entrants is about 24% of
total electricity supplied to the eligible customers. Another indicator of the
progresstowardsmorecompetitionisthenumberofsupplylicencesdeliveredre-
cently in Flanders and Wallonia to new Belgian or foreign market players, which
is about 15. Notwithstanding the fact that many owners of a supply licence are
not necessarily active yet, the number suggests that competition may increase in
the future.
Several obstacles or particular circumstances have been identified that can ex-
plain the relatively low level of competition in Belgium up till now. These include
(EC, 2002b):
- the late nomination of the TSO and the still incomplete legal implementa-
tion of the EU Electricity Directive (e.g. the regulator has not yet approved
network access tariffs). Resulting uncertainty may constitute a brake to
new market players;
- the high degree of concentration in generation. The Belgian generation
market is dominated by two incumbents, Electrabel and SPE,w h i c hr e p r e -
sent some 97% of the total electricity production. Moreover, the market
share of the largest generator, Electrabel, is around 90%. In the absence of
significant competition in generation, competition in supply has come
essentially from cross-border purchases. Nevertheless, some entrants
plan to construct new generation capacities, notably near the port of Ant-
w e r pa n di nt h eN o r t hS e a( o f f s h o r ew i n dt u r b i n e s ) ;
- the conditions of access to congested interconnection capacities with
neighbouring countries. Up till recently most of the interconnection
capacity was reserved for long-term supply contracts and used by the
main incumbent. However, recent initiatives by the Belgian, French,
Dutch and German TSOs will make the access to new entrants easier and
more transparent (see Section B1b below);
- the absence of a power exchange market. Such a market can serve as an
operating base for new entrants on the end-user market and therefore
improve competition. Power exchanges exist in Scandinavia, the Nether-
lands, Germany and France;
- some eligible customers may remain bound by long-term contracts with
Electrabel or the distribution companies. This obstacle has, however,
been removed recently in Flanders, where VREG has decided that all exist-
ing contracts between the distribution companies and the forthcoming
eligible consumers expire on 31 December 2002.1
Another way to enter the Belgian electricity market is entry by acquisition.For in-
stance, the French state-owned power company, Electricité de France, took a
share of 10% in SPE and will supply some eligible customers in Belgium from the
power plants owned by SPE. Centrica plc., a UK based energy trading company,
has bought into Flemish electricity and gas distributors.
1. Beslissing van de VREG of 7 oktober 2002 met betrekking tot de bestaande overeenkomsten tus-
sen intercommunales en eindafnemers (in English: Decision taken by the VREG on 7 October
2002, relating to the existing contracts between intermunicipal companies and end-users).Working Paper 1-03
57
B.Specific topics concerning electricity
1. Access to the network
a. Third party access
The 1999 Electricity Act creates a regulated access to electricity transport and dis-
tribution networks: suppliers have the right to access the network at approved
and published tariffs. According to the regulated third party access system, the
TSO must submit its network access tariffs for approval to the federal regulator,
These tariffs have to be based on the general tariff structure as fixed by Royal
Decree.
While waiting for these regulated tariffs, ELIA,t h eTSO, applies temporary com-
mercial conditions for providing access to its network. Moreover, further to the
legal provisions in the Flemish decree, the DSOs in Flanders have to publish their
access tariffs. In November 2002, more than half the operators had done so.
b. Cross-border interconnection
Sufficient levels and efficient use of interconnections between national electricity
grids are also key elements of the electricity market reform. Indeed, they foster
market integration and therefore competition and an increased security of elec-
tricity supply at the European level.
Belgium is relatively wellinterconnectedwithFranceandtheNetherlands:its de-
gree of interconnection capacity is around 20%.1 There is, however, no direct
connection between Belgium and Germany. Nevertheless, the scope for cross-
border trade for new entrants on the Belgian electricity market is limited by con-
gestion. This situation is due to the fact that a major part of the interconnection
capacity is reserved to cover long-term supply contracts without use-it-or-loose-
it principle. Because this may constitute a brake to the liberalisation process in
Belgium, several actions have been or are being taken to improve the situation:
- the reinforcement of cross-border capacities at the French border;
- the publication of relevant data concerning the cross-border transfer
capacities by the Belgian and neighbouring TSOs;
- the auctioning of the available capacity at the Belgian-Dutch and Dutch-
German borders, set up by the TSOs ELIA (B), TenneT (NL), RWE Netz and
E.on Netz (G).2 This auctioning has the advantage of providing a trans-
parent method for allocating the available cross-border capacity and to
facilitate the emergence of new market players in the respective coun-
tries. Capacity is allocated for three different time horizons (daily,
monthly and yearly);
- the introduction by the Belgian and French TSOs (as of 1 July 2002) of a
common system for access to the Belgian-French interconnection capac-
ity. The mechanism combines allocation on a daily and monthly basis. So
1. The ratio between net import capacity and total production capacity.
2. The available capacity is defined as the total import/export capacity reduced by the volume of
long-term contracts from the pre-liberalisation era.Working Paper 1-03
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far, the capacity was allocated on a first-come-first-serve basis, though
with priority for long-term contracts from the pre-liberalisation era;
- a consultation organised by the Belgian and French regulators in autumn
2002, targeted to the users of the interconnection capacity and relative to
the access system put in place at the Belgian-French border. The principal
objectives of this consultation were to evaluate the efficiency of the sys-
tem and to identify possible improvements.
2. Public Service Obligations
The federal and regional legislation on electricity includes provisions related to
public service obligations (PSO) to be imposed on electricity generators, network
operators and suppliers. Secondary legislation defines more precisely the tasks
and obligations of the different market players.1 The tasks and obligations of the
network operators regarding the security and reliability of electricity supply are
consistent with the technical rules for the management of the electricity transport
and distribution networks. Those of the electricity generators and suppliers are
part of the authorisation criteria for power generation and supply.
The PSO foreseen in the laws are of technical, social and environmental nature.
The first two categories relate to the guarantee of a universal and secure service
to the consumers. They cope with the right for each household to be connected to
theelectricitynetwork (a universal serviceobligation,or USO), and with safety, se-
curity, regularity and quality of supplies at an affordable price, including the
protection of vulnerable consumers. On these issues, legal provisions notably im-
pose the supply of a minimum level of electricity to households, even when they
cannot pay their bill, the installation of pre-payment meters and the application
of the social tariff to people with low levels of income.
To finance the above social measures, special funds are put in place (Social Funds
in Wallonia and the Energy Fund in Flanders). According to the level of compe-
tence, these funds are fed by special charges on the transport and distribution of
electricity, special fees related to the authorisation procedure for network exten-
sion and for electricity supply, fees on electricity supply licences, or
administrative penalties for non-compliance with the law.
The third category of PSO involves the protection of the environment through the
promotion of renewable energy sources and the rational use of energy. In this re-
spect, a Royal Decree and one major provision in the regional decrees deal with
the creation of green certificate systems.2 According to these systems, increasing
shares of electricity sales by electricity suppliers must be produced from renewa-
ble energy sources (or in combined heat and power plants (CHP) in Wallonia).3
Electricity suppliers who fail meeting the target must pay penalties, which will
feed regional Funds (the Energy Fund in Wallonia and the Renewable Energy
Fund in Flanders).
Legal provisions related to the promotion of the rational use of energy include,
among others, the setting up of a system of cogeneration certificates in Flanders,
1. Official Journal of 29 October 2002.
2. Official Journal of 23 August 2002 (the federal level is competent for offshore wind energy from
the North Sea).
3. Wallonia: 12% in 2010 (including CHP); Flanders: 5% in 2010 (excluding CHP).Working Paper 1-03
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obligations for network operators to set up electricity saving programmes aimed
at reducing electricity consumption in Flanders and in the region of Brussels-
Capital,ortoadoptanappropriatepricingformulainWallonia.Theseobligations
will be financed through the regional energy funds, whose financing will be sim-
ilar to the funds for the social PSO.
3. Welfare effects
a. Prices
A distinction between eligible and non-eligible (or captive) consumers should be
made. Electricity prices to the former category are neither regulated nor pub-
lished, and there is no wholesale market in Belgium. Electricity prices to captive
consumers are regulated and the tariff structures are published in the Official
Journal. Consequently, the focus here is on the evolution of electricity prices for
captive consumers, namely a domestic consumer consuming 3,500 kWh/year
(Figure15) andan industrial consumerconsuming 2 GWh/year (Figure16). These
categories of consumers belong to the standard consumer types of Eurostat for
which price statistics are regularly published.
Changes in consumer prices emerged mainly as a result of the application of
price-cap rules applied to the captive electricity market. These follow the govern-
ment decisions taken in April 2000 to reduce captive end-users’ prices quickly
and significantly, so that the price differences with neighbouring countries could
be eliminated by June 2002. The resulting ‘administrated’ price falls can be con-
sidered as direct effects of regulatory reform in the electricity industry although
they do not occur as a result of increased competition (see ECB, 2001).
The price reductions took four different forms:
- changes in the price calculation formula;
- temporary reductions for all consumers connected to the low voltage grid
(2000 and 2001);
- a rebate for low voltage customers, in Flanders taking the form of a free
amount of electricity (2002 onwards);
- 500 kWh free of charge annually for consumers benefiting of the social
tariff.
According to the CCEG, the measures adopted in 2000, 2001 and 2002 should re-
duce most of the price differences with neighbouring countries. The costs of the
measures are born by the electric utilities (production and distribution) and fi-
nanced by productivity gains.
Nevertheless, part of the above price reductions were counterbalanced by an in-
crease in production costs resulting from high natural gas prices. Changes in
electricity prices are indeed strongly influenced by the developments in fuel pric-
es but not equally in each country. The changes reflect several factors, one of
whichis theunderlyingtechnologyofelectricity generationandtheresultingmix
of primary energy sources. In Belgium, around 20% of electricity is produced in
gas-fuelled power plants.
The combination of ‘administrated’ price falls and high naturalgas prices have in
practice led to a stabilising of electricity prices for domestic consumers. The im-Working Paper 1-03
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pact of the tariff reform has only become obvious since the beginning of 2002
when gas prices stopped rising. Nevertheless, electricity prices for households in
Belgium remain in general among the highest in Europe. In 2001 they were about
15% higher than the EU average,but the gap came down steadily to 10% in Janu-
ary 2002 and to 9% in July 2002. However, there are categories of domestic
consumers,inparticularthoseconsuminglessthan1,200kWhperyear,forwhich
electricity prices have decreased by more than 10%. This reflects the social focus
of the reform of electricity tariffs.
FIGURE 15 - Electricity prices for domestic consumers (3,500 kWh/year)*
Source: Eurostat.
* Current prices excluding VAT and taxes.
Between January 1999 and July 2002 Electricity prices for Belgian industrial con-
sumers with an annual consumption of 2 GWh have increased slightly by 2.7%,
while they have decreased in almost all other member states. Again, rising natu-
ral gas prices may explain this trend. However, constant prices in Belgium have
decreased over the same period. So far, the opening-up of the electricity market
has not brought Belgian electricity prices to the EU average; electricity prices for
the Belgian industry remain higher than those for the European competitors.
FIGURE 16 - Electricity prices for industrial consumers (2 GWh/year)*
Source: Eurostat.
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b. Quality
Besides price reductions and the implementation of PSO (see Section 2 above), the
reformoftheelectricitysectorbrought benefitsinterms ofenergyservices offered
to the different categories of consumers. As far as industry is concerned, several
energy services in combination to electricity sales are offered against payment.
These are essentially targeting at a more rational use of electricity (energy audits,
technical consulting). There are also initiatives to improve the quality of services
to the customers of the distribution companies. These initiatives include energy
advice, information on more efficient electric appliances and faster intervention
in case of power failure.
4. Other topics
a. Power system security
Because electricity cannot be stored, different systems or mechanisms are set up
to ensure that electricity supply continuously matches electricity demand. These
include, among others, the development of interconnection capacity between Eu-
ropean countries (see Section 1b above), the constitution of reserve capacities of
production and the implementation of a market balancing system.
Belgium is in a position to meet peak demand with its own production means.
The difference between the total available capacity for internal demand on the
one hand, and the maximum peak demand and the required reserve capacity on
the other hand, represents some 7% of the total available capacity.
The respective tasks and obligations of the market players, and in particular of
the TSO, regarding the balance between electricity supply and demand is de-
scribed in the grid code. Since October 2001, ELIA has implemented a balancing
mechanism. According to this system, the responsible parties may ask ELIA to
compensate for the imbalance between their injections to and takings from the
network against payment. The required price is related to electricity prices on the
APX and Powernext power exchange markets.
b. Investments
Since the implementation of the 1999 Electricity Act, there are no more obliga-
tions or incentives regarding investments in electricity generation for the market
operators. The only exception concerns the requirement of minimum shares of
electricity produced from renewable energy sources or by cogeneration specified
in the regional decrees. Instead, decennial indicative programmes for electricity
generation must be elaborated every three years. It defines the preferred power
generation means based on technical, economic and environmental considera-
tions. The first indicative programme is due for 2002.
The indicative programme is formulated by CREG in collaboration with the Ener-
gy Administration of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and after consultation
with the TSO, the Federal Planning Bureau (FPB), CCEG, the Office for Sustainable
Development and the regional Governments. It is subject to approval by the Min-Working Paper 1-03
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istry of Energy who also publishes the report. A draft of the first indicative
programme hasbeenproducedatthe beginningof2002.Atpresent, the finaldoc-
ument is to be transmitted to the Ministry of Energy.
Despite the indicative character of the programme for electricity generation and
regarding the long-term security of electricity supply, the Government has the
possibility to launch an international call for tender for the construction of new
electricity generationcapacity. Moreover, new power plants are subject toauthor-
isation by the Ministry of Energy.
As for investments in transport capacities, including interconnectors, the TSO will
carry out a transmission development plan for the transport grid in collaboration
with CREG. This plan has a seven-year horizon and must be updated every two
years. It is subject to approval by the Ministry of Energy. The first plan is due
within twelve months after the nomination of the TSO, hence in September 2003.
Contrary to the programme for electricity generation, the transmission develop-
ment plan is binding.Working Paper 1-03
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IV Gas
A.The gas sector in Belgium1
1. Sector structure
Belgium has no indigenous gas production and relies exclusively on gas imports.
Therefore, the gas sector is built up of only two major activities: network opera-
tions (transport, distribution and storage) and trade (purchase and supply).
Until recently, the gas industry was characterised by the existence of a dominant
integrated private company, Distrigas, having a de facto monopoly on gas imports
and supplies to large customers and distribution companies, and a legal monop-
oly on transport and storage operations. Similarly to the electricity sector, the
principal aim of recent reforms was not the in-depth restructuring of the gas in-
dustry. There are, however, two exceptions: the unbundling of network system
operations from sales activities and the removal of Distrigas’ monopoly in trans-
port and storage. At the distribution level as well, regional legislation provides
for a mandatory legal separation between network operations and gas sales to el-
igible consumers.
At theend of 2001, Distrigas was legally unbundledinto two separate companies:
a gas transport company named Fluxys and a trade company with the existing
name Distrigas. The legal unbundling was an initiative of Distrigas, anticipating
the amended EU Gas Directive (see section 2a below). The Belgian legislation on
gas only requires the separation of accounts relative to network operations and
sales activities. The activities of the transport system operator (TSO) Fluxys in-
clude transport services, flexibility and transport-related services, such as
terminal handling and storage of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The activities of the
trade company Distrigas encompass natural gas sales in Belgium and in Europe,
natural gas purchasing, LNG trade and shipping, and international transport ca-
pacity trade.
Distrigas and Fluxys have the same shareholders. The leading shareholder is
Tractebel (46.8%), which is the energy branch of the French company Suez. The
remaining shares are allocated between Publigaz (25%), Belgian Shell (16.7%), the
stock exchange (11.5%) and the Belgian State who owns a single share, the so-
called ‘Golden Share’.
The structure of the natural gas supply market differs according to the annual
consumption of the gas customers. Customers consuming at least 1 million m³ of
1. State of play November 2002.Working Paper 1-03
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gas per year (large industrial consumers, electricity producers and gas distribu-
tion companies) are supplied directly by Distrigas - or by other gas suppliers -
and belong to the so-called ‘transport’ category. At present, five companies hold
a licence to supply gas to the eligible customers of the ‘transport’ category. The
other consumers are supplied by the distribution companies and belong to the
‘public distribution’ category, which is not eligible yet.
Although the municipalities do not have the legal monopoly in the distribution
of natural gas, distribution is organised in a similar way as the electricity sector.
Municipalities confer exclusive rights on distribution companies to distribute gas
in their geographical area. Distribution companies are either formed by the local
authorities themselves (pure intermunicipal companies) or co-owned by the elec-
tricity incumbent Electrabel (mixed intermunicipal companies). In 2001, there
were 5 pure and 15 mixed intermunicipal companies. Consequently, Electrabel is
also a major player in gas distribution.
Finally, the recent development of a gas wholesale market in Belgium at the hub
of Zeebrugge is worth noting. Huberator, a subsidiary of Fluxys and Distrigas,
operates the hub, which offers gas trading opportunities to gas and electricity
companies. As a matter of fact, more and more European electric utilities are ac-
tive in gas trading, in particular Electrabel, the dominant actor on the Belgian
electricity market. This illustrates the development or the strengthening, all over
Europe, of horizontal integration of gas and electricity activities.
2. Legal framework
a. EU level
The main EU legislative framework at the basis of the reform of the Belgian gas
industry is Directive 98/30/EC concerning common rules for the internal market
in natural gas.1 The directive introduces competition in the European gas indus-
try. It lays down the rules relating to the organisation and functioning of the gas
market, access to national gas transport systems, the operations of systems, and
the criteria and procedures applicable to the granting of authorisations for trans-
port, distribution, supply and storage of natural gas.
With the aim of speeding up the liberalisation of the gas market and integrating
other policy objectives (e.g. security of energy supply, consumer protection), the
European Energy Council approved the draft of a new directive on 25 November
2002.2 The key elements of this draft are:
- a faster time schedule for the full opening of the electricity market (full
competition by 1 July 2007);
- legal unbundling between network management and production and
sales activities;
- regulated and published access tariffs;
1. Official Journal L 204 of 21 July 1998.
2. Based on COM(2002)304 final of 7 June 2002: Amended proposal for a Directive amending Direc-
tives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC and for a regulation on conditions for access to the network for
cross-border exchanges in electricity.Working Paper 1-03
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- establishment of an independent regulatory body1;
- additional measures regarding the security of energy supply and public
service obligations (PSO).
b. Belgian level
Similarly to the electricity sector, the transposition of the European Gas Directive
into Belgian lawimpliestheadoptionofboth federalandregional legislation.The
federal legislative and administrative provisions focus on gas transport, gas sup-
p l yt ot h e‘ t r a n s p o r t ’c a t e g o r yo fc u s t o m e r s ,l o n gt e r mp l a n n i n ga n dc o m p e t i t i o n
issues. The regional legislative and administrative provisions deal with gas dis-
tribution, gas supply to the ‘distribution’ customers and the rational use of
energy (mainly cogeneration).
At the federal level, Belgium has implemented Directive 98/30/EC through pri-
mary legislation in 1999 by amending the Gas Act of 1965.2 In July 2001, new
amendments to the Gas Act were adopted.3 These amendments included, among
others, eligibility thresholds, access to the network, unbundling and financing of
public service obligations (PSO). Secondary legislation is being worked out but is
not completed yet. Belgium still has to adopt Royal Decrees related notably to the
Code of Good Conduct for the access to the transport network.
At the regional level, a decree relating to the organisation of the gas market in
Flanders (the Gas Decree) was adopted in 2001 and secondary legislation is being
completed.4 The Walloon government approved a draft decree in 2001 and the re-
gion of Brussels-Capital a draft order in October 2002. Both texts are likely to be
adopted in early 2003.
c. Role of the State and the market regulators
The role of the federal Government relates mainly to the security of gas supply,
large infrastructures for transport and the setting of tariffs. The Belgian State
holds one specific preferential share, the so-called ‘Golden Share’ in both Distri-
gas and Fluxys. This share grants the Government the power of veto in matters
of national energy policy. Moreover, just as for the electricity sector, the Ministry
of Energy is responsible for granting transport and supply licences. The Ministry
of Economic Affairs fixes maximum prices for gas sales to captive customers. The
1999 Gas Act also gives the possibility to the Ministry of Economic Affairs to fix
maximumprices forgassupplyto eligibleconsumers,butnodecision istaken yet
on this issue.
As for the regulation and control of the gas market, Belgium has five bodies,
which are the same as for the electricity market: four regulators for the opened
segments of the market (CREG at the federal level and VREG, CWaPE and BIM/IGBE
at the regional level), and CCEG for the captive segments of the market.Their roles
are similar to those for electricity (see Chapter III, Section A2c).
1. Independent of the interests of the electricity industry and of politics.
2. Official Journal of 11 May 1999 and 30 June 1966, respectively.
3. Official Journal of 20 July 2001.
4. Official Journal of 3 October 2001 and 18 October 2002, respectively.Working Paper 1-03
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3. Progress in market opening
According to present legislative provisions, the time schedule for opening-up the
gas market is summarised in Table 14. At the moment, electric utilities, consum-
ers connected to the transport network and consuming more than 5 million m³
per year and cogenerators located in Flanders are eligible. Because no eligibility
thresholds have been decided or adopted yet at the regional level, customers of
the public distribution have no freedom to choose their gas supplier.
TABLE 14 - Eligibility thresholds for gas in Belgium
Source: FPB/BfP.
* According to the proposal, these consumers will be automatically eligible as soon as the decree is published in the Official Journal.
** As an intermediate step, consumers consuming more than 15 mio m³ per year shall be eligible by 2003.
The adopted time schedule translates into the following theoretical market open-
ing: 47% of total gas consumption in 2000 and 58% in 2001 and 2002.
Nevertheless, there have so far been very limited changes to the gas supply mar-
ket. The eligible gas market is still dominated by the incumbent utility Distrigas.
In 2000 and 2001, only two large industrial consumers have received gas from
other suppliers whose market share can be estimated at less than 5% of the eligi-
ble volume. There are several reasons for this. First, the implementation of the EU
Gas Directive inBelgium is stillatan early stage.Inparticular,major piecesoflaw
regarding access to the transport network are missing (regulated tariffs, transport
licenses). The resulting uncertainty makes potential suppliers to adopt a cautious
attitude.
Other reasons for the low pace in market opening include:
- the fact that a number of eligible gas buyers are locked into medium term
contracts with the incumbent. Consequently, only those with short-term
supply contracts with the incumbent can renegotiate the terms of their
contract (in the form of price reductions for instance) or switch to a new
supplier;
- the horizontal integration between the incumbent Distrigas and gas dis-
tributors. The ultimate shareholder of Distrigas, Suez, has interests in the
majority of the gas distributors through Electrabel;
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- the link between the gas buyer/importer Distrigas and the incumbent
electric company Electrabel through a common ownership structure (the
French company Suez). Electrabel represents about one fifth of Distrigas’
sales in Belgium. Moreover, Electrabel is active in gas trading;
- the lack of quality conversion services between the high and the low calo-
rific gas grids. This leads to the impossibility for high calorific gas suppli-
ers to access the low calorific gas grid (in the North East of Belgium). This
situation puts many customers out of reach;
Notwithstanding the slow progress in market opening, there are now five com-
panies that hold a gas supply licence and initiatives from distribution companies
have already taken place in view of the forthcoming eligibility. The latter is the
case in Flanders, where the Luminus consortium covers 8% of the public distri-
bution of gas.
B.Specific topics concerning gas
1. Access to the network
According to the Belgian Gas Act, the access to the gas transport network is reg-
ulated: the structure of network tariffs is specified by Royal Decree and the
regulator should approve the tariffs proposed by the gas TSO according to this
structure.1 Regulated tariffs apply to the connection to and use of the transport net-
work and LNG infrastructure, and to ancillary services. On the contrary, tariffs for
gas transit are negotiated between the parties. The regulator approved the trans-
port tariffs in September 2002. These tariffs are published on Fluxys’ website and
came into force in November 2002.
The new transport tariffs are not distance-related and cost-reflective. This type of
tariffs should facilitate the development of competition. Indeed, since the Belgian
gas network has several entry nodes, distance-related tariffs may not reflect the
actual transport costs because the physical path of gas transported does not al-
ways match the contracted path. On the contrary, the balancing regime set up by
Fluxys that requires transport users to balance supply and demand over very
short periods of time (hourly) and to purchase flexibility services in advance, is
not likely to offer favourable conditions for new market entrants.
2. Public Service Obligations
The Belgian Gas Act includes general provisions related to PSO to be imposed on
gas transport, distribution and supply companies. For instance, the tasks and ob-
ligations of the holders of transport licences relate to the extension of the existing
infrastructure provided the investment is economic. The tasks and obligations of
the holders of a supply licence deal with the regularity and quality of the supply
and the requirement to supply distribution companies and customers connected
tothe gas system. For the moment, aRoyal Decreeprecisely defines the PSO of the
1. Official Journal of 23 April 2002.Working Paper 1-03
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market players as regards the captive customers and the way they will be fi-
nanced, but no PSO are specified yet for the eligible customers.1
At the regional level (Flanders), similar provisions exist for the distribution sys-
tem operators (DSOs) and for the holders of a supply licence. But the Gas Decree
includes alsoprovisions for social andenvironmental measures, suchas theguar-
antee of a minimum gas supply, programmes for the rational use of energy, and
the setting up of a heat-certificate system to promote cogeneration. Secondary
legislation about definition and implementation issues is awaited. The long-term
s ec ur it yofg ass u p p l yi sal s oc o ns i der edaPSO.T hi si s su ewi l lb edea ltw it hi nS ec-
tion 4.
Regarding the geographical coverage of the gas pipeline system, Belgium has a
well-developed gas network. By the end of 2001, about 60% of the households
were connected to the gas grid. The transport and distribution networks continue
to be modernised and developed, so that an increasing number of industrial and
domestic consumers will have access to the gas network.
3. Welfare effects
a. Prices
One expected benefit from market opening comes from reductions in consumer
gas prices. The extent to which price reductions occurs effectively depends onthe
cost structure of gas tariffs and on the evolution of the cost elements, namely bor-
der price, transport/wholesale/storage costs and distribution/retail costs. For
l a r g ec o n s u m e r s ,t h eb o r d e rp r i c ei su s u a l l yt h el a r g e s te l e m e n to ft h et o t a lp r i c e ,
while for domestic customers, border price and distribution/retail costs are al-
most equally important, namely around 40% each of total price excluding taxes.
The liberalisation process of the gas industry is not expected to affect the border
price ofgas significantly, at least in theyears to come.Indeed, thereis no evidence
of a fundamental move away from gas pricing according to its market value (oil
price indexation). In the short period since the market opening, oil prices were
high compared to the prior period. Consequently, the border price of gas in-
creased and so did all consumer gas prices.
In contrast, gastransport tariffs decreased steadilyduring 2001-2002 as a result of
liberalisation. For instance, the new regulated transport tariffs that came into
force on 1 November 2002 led to a reduction of 7% compared to previous tariffs.
Nevertheless, the 2001 reduction in transport tariffs did not compensate for the
high border prices of gas and consumer gas prices remained high in comparison
to the levels that held before the market opening.
Figures 17 and 18 show the evolution of gas prices in Belgium and its neighbour-
ingcountriesfortwocategoriesofcaptive consumers:householdswithanaverage
annual consumption of 83.7 GJ, and industrial customers with an average annual
consumption of 41,860 GJ.2 Both categories of consumers are standard consumer
categories for Eurostat. The figures are also compared to the EU average. In view
1. Official Journal of 6 November 2002.
2. I.e. about 1 million m³.Working Paper 1-03
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of the short period over which the gas markets have been open, price trends must
be analysed with caution, and the extent to which major differences across coun-
tries can be attributed to market opening is all but straightforward.
In all countries, prices rose during 1999-2001 as a result of the increase in oil pric-
es, but then declined rather steadily until January 2002. For countries in the Euro
zone, the increase in gas prices was amplified by the falling exchange rate be-
tween the euro and the US dollar. Until the beginning of 2001, prices for the
selected categories of consumers were higher in Belgium than in the neighbour-
ing countries except Germany, and than the EU average. The gap was also more
important for households than for industry. However, during 2001, Belgian gas
prices decreased faster than in the other countries and turned below the EU aver-
age for both categories ofconsumers. The reasonfor this development is achange
in the tariff structure for captive customers.
FIGURE 17 - Gas prices for domestic consumers (83.7 GJ/year)*
Source: Eurostat.
* Current prices excluding VAT and taxes.
The price increase was stronger in relative terms for industry thanforhouseholds
due to the more important role of border prices in the price structure of the latter
category of consumers. Gas prices for households increased by some 27% in Bel-
gium between January 1999 and July 2002, which is in the range of increase in the
neighbouring countries. Gas prices for industry increased by 47% in Belgium
over the same period to be compared to increases of some 50% in France, 55% for
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FIGURE 18 - Gas prices for industrial consumers (41860 GJ/year)*
Source: Eurostat.
* Current prices excluding VAT and taxes.
The development of the short-term or wholesale gas market of Zeebrugge may
give some scope to reduce the average gas supply price. The possibility for Dis-
trigas and other potential gas suppliers to buy significant volumes of
competitively priced short-term gas on the Zeebrugge spot market had a benefi-
cial effect on the average gas import price. The resulting price reductions are then
passed on to the gas price to keep or to attract eligible customers. The beneficial
effect of short-term gas supply markets will, however, remain limited because
long term contracts will continue to dominate the gas supply portfolio in order to
ensure the security of gas supply.
When gas prices decrease on the spot market, non-eligible consumers cannot ben-
efit since the tariff structure does not take into account the spot market prices.
Instead, their gas import prices are determined on the basis of long-term supply
contracts following the oil prices. Therefore the Government decided in July 2000
to adapt some of the other elements determining the consumer price, e.g. those
for personnel and material costs. This was done in the perspective of the acceler-
ated market opening and in the context of the then sharply increasing oil prices.
When oil prices started to fall in 2001, the Belgian gas prices could thus fall
strongerthan thepricesin theneighbouring countries.Thepricecutsapplymain-
ly, but not only, to domestic consumers with low income levels.
b. Quality
One may fear that productivity policies in the interest of competitive pricing in
transit services and third party access, operated by the gas utility company with
regard to network operations and construction activities, are made at the expense
of safety and the environment. So far, however, no negative impact on the safety
and quality of gas supply, nor on the environment can be noticed. The TSO took
several initiatives to ensure safety and environmental protection, namely:
- the development of an integrated safety management system since 1999,
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- the regular inspection of the gas infrastructure to identify elements that
m a yp r e s e n tas a f e t yr i s ki nf u t u r e ;
- the launching of an environmental action programme in 2000;
- the introduction of an environmental quality insurance system, covering
all gas facilities of the TSO.
4. Other topics: long-term security of natural gas supply
Because Belgium has no indigenous gas production and relies solely on imports,
the 1999 Gas Act requires the elaboration of a ten-year indicative plan for the Bel-
gian gas supply, in order to monitor the long-term security of natural gas supply.
The plan identifies the necessary investments to safeguard the functioning of the
gasmarketandmaintainsecurityofsupply.Itmustbeupdatedeverythreeyears.
The indicative plan is formulated by CREG (2001b) in collaboration with the Ener-
gy Administration of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, after consultation with
the gas industry (Figas), the Federal Planning Bureau (FPB), the CCEG,t h eO f f i c e
for Sustainable Development and the regional governments. It is subject to ap-
proval by the Ministry of Energy who publishes makes the report. The first




A.The postal sector in Belgium
1. Sector structure
a. The structure and dynamics of the postal sector
In the context of the present paper, the postal sector is atypical in the sense that it
does not possess a physical infrastructure to convey its services. It rather makes
use of the infrastructure of road, rail and air transport, with post-offices, postbox-
es and sorting-centres as thenodes. Nevertheless,this does not takeaway that the
postal sector is a sheer example of a network industry. Just like the other sectors
discussed in this paper, the sector consists of a system of nodes and links along
which, in this case, the postal items are conveyed.
A second atypical feature is that an analysis according to a vertical segmentation
is not useful for the moment. Such a segmentation gives a chain of four activities:
(1) collecting; (2) sorting; (3) transporting; and (4) delivery of letters, parcels and
printed matter. As these activities are usually integrated into one company ex-
ploiting its own network, there is presently no need to make a distinction
between the four activities.
More useful than the vertical is the horizontal segmentation. In that case a basic
distinction is made between postal services, which still act in a reserved market;
and parcel and express services, which act in a free market. The reserved market
holds for all postal items (except express letters) up to 100 grammes, to be later
reduced to 50 grammes. In Germany, the Netherlands and most Scandinavian
countries, steps towards this reduction have already been taken. In Belgium, the
100 grammes threshold is strictly applied.
The reserved market is served by a state monopoly (De Post / La Poste). For par-
cel and express services, five companies possess 62% of the market in Belgium,
leaving the remaining 38% for a few hundred smaller companies.1 The five large
companies arethefourintegrators (DHL, Fedex, TNT and UPS) andrailway-subsid-
iary ABX. Besides these large companies, there is a number of smaller companies
active in the Belgian market. Finally, numerous small courier services are operat-
ing locally. In sum, there are about 700 companies active in the sector. The private
segment of the postal sector is growing steadily. Employment in this segment in-
creased from 1,700 in 1993 to 6,200 in 1999.
1. The parcel and express turnover of De Post itself is thus not included in this 62/38 ratio.Working Paper 1-03
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Further specific features of the postal sector are (IEI, 1999; Anderloni & Pilley,
2002):
- a natural monopoly in the last segment of the chain, which is delivery;
- a high labour intensity: in general about 80% of the costs are labour costs;
- a stagnant demand caused by the growth of fax and email services;
- a technological development allowing for cost savings;
-a u n i f o r m p r i c i n g ;
- a service based on confidence (privacy of letters).
The postal sector has become a dynamic sector. Several developments brought
about the end of the era of simple mail delivery. These developments imply big
challenges for both public and private entrepreneurship. Major determinants are:
- the genesis of niche markets: parcel services, express services, banking
services, logistic services, electronic services, graphical services, consul-
tancy, printing, archiving, etc.;
- increasing cross-border services as a result of the globalisation of the
economy;
- the introduction of new technologies: automatic sorting, tracking & trac-
ing, computerising front- and back-offices.
b. The incumbent (De Post/La Poste)
The Belgian incumbent for postal services (De Post/La Poste) is limited company
since2000.Itisnot quoted,allsharesareownedby theBelgian State.1 Despitethis
public ownership, De Post is independent from the State. The law only imposes
universal and public service obligations (USO/PSO), among which are mail deliv-
ery and banking services. The conditions under which these USO/PSO are carried
out are laid down in quinquennial management contracts with the State. The first
covered 1992-1996, the second 1997-2001, the present 2002-2006.
The company is subdivided into a series of business units that are grouped into
three basic categories:
1. Mail: the activity chain for letter-post, printed matter, newspapers, maga-
zines, direct mail and non-addressed mail, international consignments
included;
2. Retail: management and operation of post-offices, savings-banking, prop-
erty and life insurance, and miscellaneous financial services such as
money orders and management of State accounts;
3. New business: e.g. printing & archiving, electronic services, direct market-
ing, parcels and express mail.
M a n yo ft h ea b o v ea c t i v i t i e sa r ec a r r i e do u tb ys u b s i d i a r i e so fD eP o s t .T h e r ea r e
more than 15 of such companies, more than half of which are fully owned.
- Fully owned are companies active in international consignments, print-
ing & archiving, electronic services, direct marketing, parcels, express
mail and publicity.
- Partly owned (50% or more) are companies active in distribution of news-
papers and magazines, administrative mail, post-office outlets, banking,
insurance and digital certification.
1. Approved by Royal Decree of 17 March 2000.Working Paper 1-03
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In the context of the forthcoming market opening a strategic plan was developed
in 2001, and revised in 2002. This plan, elaborated in conjunction with a re-
nowned consultant, aims for a thorough modernisation of the company. An
extensiveinvestment programmewill bring aboutsignificantimprovementsdur-
ing 2001-2003. For an amount of almost 600 million euro, De Post wants to
improve its efficiency in such a way that it can compete with the best foreign mail
operators.Ofthis amount,250 million willbe investedin modernisingthesorting
centres. 10 million is foreseen for automation of the process of ‘door-products’,
such as parcels and registered letters. The investment programme also includes
125million euro for ICTinfrastructureinthepost-offices,and150 millionformod-
ernising the post-offices. 33 million euro will be spent on a new distribution
network for express mail, and 8 million on e-fulfilment. To finance the invest-
ments, De Post will get a 300 million euro capital injection from the State.
2. Legal framework
a. EU level
The gradual opening of the European postal market was started by the Council
with Directive 97/67/EC. This directive did not explicitly institute market open-
ing yet, it rather shaped conditions for an adequate opening in later years.
Important items concern the universal service and the reserved area.
- The universal service should, in short, guarantee a nationally covering
network for the daily delivery of items up to 10 kg. Among others, the
directive sets minimal conditions, pricing principles, accounting trans-
parency, quality standards and quality measurement.
- The reserved area involves that the treatment of domestic mail up to 100
grammes may be exclusively awarded to the contractor of the universal
service.1 Implicitly, the market is thus opened for items above 100
grammes and for all outward international mail, but this concerns only a
very small part of the market.
- Furthermore, the nomination of independent national regulators is stipu-
lated.
When this directive is strictly followed, the following situation holds: the govern-
menthascontractedauniversalserviceproviderforpostalservices,betterknown
as the incumbent. For all items up to 100 grammes, this incumbent has the exclu-
sive rights. For items between 100 grammes and 10 kg, the market is open for
competition, but the incumbent should guarantee the universal service.2 For
items above 10 kg the market is open.
The actual market opening started recently with Directive 2002/39/EC.I nf a c t ,
this directiveis an amending act to the prior directive.However,avery important
amendment is the timetable for the market opening for items below the threshold
of 350 grammes which was prevailing in 2002. By January 2003, the reserved area
was cut down to items of at most 100 grammes. In 2006 the threshold will be fur-
ther reduced to 50 grammes.3 No full market opening is foreseen yet, but this will
1. Moreover, a second criterion holds: the price of delivery is at most three times the price of deliv-
ering a standardised letter. This basically excludes express mail from the reserved area. Also out-
bound cross-border mail is excluded from the reserved area.
2. For international mail the threshold is 20 kg.
3. Second criterion: the price of delivery is at most two-and-a-half times the price of delivering a
standardised letter.Working Paper 1-03
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not happen before 2009. According to the directive, non-reserved may not be sub-
sidised, whereas services within the reserved area may. The directive also allows
for a monitoring on antitrust rules. Despite the market opening, there is no de-
traction from the guarantee of universal service as stipulated in Directive 97/67.
b. Belgian level
In Belgium the two EU directives were turned into law by Royal Decree in 1999
and 2002, respectively. A regulator, the Belgian Institute for Post and Telecommu-
nications (BIPT/IBPT), was already nominated in 1991. As already indicated in
Chapter II (Section A3c), a review was started that will make this regulator fully
independent from the Government.
Besides the implementation of the EU directives, important legal arrangements
are made in Acts of 1956, 1970 and 1991. The 1956 Act holds fundamental legisla-
tion that defines and determines everything concerning the postal service. The
1970 Act determines the tariff system. The 21 March1991 Act concernsthe reform
of specific public enterprises, such as De Post, NMBS and Belgacom. This act lays
down the relationship with the Government and establishes the regulator, BIPT.
This independence, however, is limited by that same act because De Post must
fulfil USO and PSO. The rules and conditions under which De Post must carry out
these obligations are laid down in quinquennial management contracts.
The present management contract covers 2002-2006. The contract sets the rules
concerning the PSO. Basic tasks are the daily mail delivery for the reserved area,
the free provision of financial services and some specific obligations for the State.
For the losses incurred in fulfilling the PSO,thegovernmentpays acompensation.
This compensation is annually determined by the Council of Ministers, and was
settled at 227 million euro for 2002. Besides, the contract fulfils the criteria for USO
determined by the EU directives, which are quality, universality and financial ac-
cessibility. Noteworthyis the emphasison quality. In2006, 95% ofthe preferential
items should be delivered the next day (for 2001 this was estimated at 75%).1 Fur-
thermore, frequent measurements of customer satisfaction should be carried out
by the regulator. Finally, the contract sets basic principles for pricing, and for the
density of the post-office network.
Besides the EU directives and the 21 March 1991 Act, two 1956 Acts and 1970 De-
crees areofimportance.Theyconcern DePostasacompany,andholdregulations
on the postal service and postal cheques.
c. Summary role of the government
The Belgian government is owner and authority of the postal services. As an
owner, it may influence appointments of the board and management of the com-
pany. However, it also has to take account of the independence of the company.
As an authority it sets the USO and PSO, and serves as a market regulator. USO and
PSO are set in the quinquennial management contracts, including the financial
compensation the State grants for the fulfilment.
1. In the present year, 92% of the items should be delivered the next day, as measured by an inter-
nationally standardised method.Working Paper 1-03
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The tasks of the market regulator are assigned to BIPT.T h et a s k so ft h i sr e g u l a t o r
are listed in detail in the 21 March 1991 Act. Basically, it monitors the sector and
serves as a house of appeals. Up to now BIPT has directly fallen under the control
ofthegovernment,sothatit couldnotbelabelledasindependent.However,abill
was recently approved that will change its statute. The same type of organisation
will be adopted as is applied for other regulating bodies, such as the Banking and
Financial Commission (CBF) and the Commission for the Regulation of Electricity
and Gas (CREG). The BIPT will become more flexible, especially as regards the re-
cruitment of staff. This will put the institute in a better position to adapt to the
unceasing dynamics of the post and telecoms industries. For further information
of BIPT and its reform, see Section A3c of Chapter II.
3. Progress in market opening
The market opening and universal service provision in Belgium are precisely the
same as required for by Directive 97/67. The government has not decided to ac-
celerate the market opening. On the other hand, it has also not decided to extend
thethresholdfor USO beyond 10 kg.1 The first stage of the further market opening
was realised in January 2003, the next stage will be realised in 2006.
As parts of the market are already opened, a number of competitors is active on
the Belgian market. These companies are potential competitors for De Post when
the market opening will be extended. The four world-market leaders for parcels
and express mail have built up their networks in Belgium, and employ almost
6,000 people. Furthermore, foreign incumbents, either in joint venture or inde-
pendent, are becoming active in Belgium.
B.Specific topics concerning the postal services
1. Universal service obligations
Postalserviceshave USO.Theyar eimposedontheEUlevelbyDirective97/67and
adopted as an amendment of the 21 March 1991 Act. The directive sets common
rules concerning the definition, criteria, pricing principles, quality and regulation
of the universal service.
- Definition: Postal services must be permanently available for all users at
affordable prices and of specified quality, and at all places on a member
state’s territory, even when and where it is commercially unattractive.
The density of post-office and pillar-box networks must fulfil the needs of
the customers.
- Criteria: During five days per week, there must be at least one collection
and one delivery per day. The universal service concerns all consign-
ments up to 10 kg, registered letters and items with declared value. Mem-
ber states have the freedom to extend the service to at most 20 kg. Cross-
border consignments are included in the universal service. The State
supervises the delivery of the universal service. The State may organise
1. Extension to 20 kg is allowed for.Working Paper 1-03
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financial compensation when the service can only be delivered at too
high cost.
- Pricing principles: Prices must be affordable, cost-based, transparent and
non-discriminatory. Companies must have separate accounts for univer-
sal and non-universal, and for reserved and non-reserved services.
- Quality: The member states must establish quality standards concerning
delivery time, regularity and reliability. At least annually, an independent
body must examine the performance on these standards. Customer com-
plaints must be treated in a transparent, simple and inexpensive way.
- Regulation: Every member state nominates at least one legally and func-
tionally independent regulator for the postal sector. They must take care
of the fulfilment of the directive and may also serve as an antitrust
authority.
For Belgium, fulfilment of the criteria concerning quality, universality and finan-
cial accessibility is guaranteed by the third management contract. The Belgian
law does not give the regulator the role of antitrust authority.
2. Public service obligations
Postal services have PSO that typically include the USO. They are imposed on the
national level by the 21 March 1991 Act and the management contracts. This con-
tract combines the social role of De Post with modern customer-oriented services
that fulfil thehighestquality standards.Theservicesconcern mail delivery, finan-
cial services and services of general interest. The contract also indicates the
reserved area, the State compensation, the quality standards and standards for
the post-office network.
- Mail delivery: This includes also newspapers and magazines. Note that
separate agreements on the conditions of the service are concluded with
the State and the publishers;
- Financial services: De Post must guarantee the universal banking service in
the sense that every citizen must be able to do financial transactions via a
bank account and at an affordable cost. Furthermore, De Post must take
care for the payment of pensions and disability benefits. Special attention
will be paid to the safety of the postmen carrying this money;
- Services of general interest: Among the tasks imposed are the furnishing of
post-offices with infrastructure that facilitates the communication
between the citizens and government, for example Internet terminals;
- Reserved area: The maximum criteria of the respective EU directives are
applied (100 grammes or three times the price of a standard letter);
- Financial relations with the State: The State pays an annual compensation
for the losses on public services that cannot be rendered at a profit. The
compensation is based on the actual cost as derived from an analytical
accounting system. The actual amount is determined annually. For 2002 it
was 227 million euro;
- Quality standards: Much attention is paid to the relation with the custom-
ers. For example, staff will be educated in customer relations. New qual-
ity standards are set. In 2002, 91% of all (priority) items must be delivered
the next day. In 2006, this must have gradually grown to 95%. When the
standards are not met, financial sanctions are imposed. Furthermore, BIPT
and De Post itself will frequently measure customer satisfaction;Working Paper 1-03
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- Post-offices: Every municipality must have at least one post-office or
postal service outlet, which must fulfil the USO and PSO.T h es e r v i c eo u t -
lets (a new phenomenon for municipalities too small for a full post-office)
will be developed in an active and creative way, and in co-operation with
other public services. All offices will be accessible for the disabled.
3. Welfare effects
As there has been hardly any market opening yet, at least in terms of volume and
turnover, no welfare effects could be measured for the moment. Nevertheless
something can be said about prices and quality in relation to the management
contract.
a. Prices
As in many other countries, a system of uniform prices is employed. This implies
that for each given category of mail there is only one price, irrespective of wheth-
er the mail is delivered in densely urbanised or in remote areas. Postal tariffs in
Belgium are somewhat lowerthan in othercountries.This may,however,bemore
a consequence of the relatively short distances than of a higher level of efficiency.
b. Quality
As shown above, the management contract demands for a number of measures
to enhance quality. The number of items delivered the next day must increase
from91% in2002 to95% in2006. Inpractice, however,itishard tomeet the stand-
ard. According to the measurement of De Post itself, only 85% of the mail was
delivered the next day in 2001, but this increased to 92% during the first half of
2002. According to an independent measurement that applies another, interna-
tionally standardised, method, the 2001 performance was even lower: 79%. To
become better able to meet the standards, De Post recently introduced a distinc-
tion between priority and non-priority mail. As the next day delivery standard
only holds for priority mail, De Post may then concentrate on meeting this strict




A.The railway sector in Belgium
1. Sector structure
a. The structure of the railway sector
In the railway sector a basic distinction exists between network management and
train operations. Besides, there are secondary activities such as station operations
and property management, and the activity of train operations is usually subdi-
vided into passengers and freight. According to EU legislation, there should at
least be separated accounts between the two basic segments, and within the op-
erations segment between public services and other operations (usually
passengers versus freight). Member states, however, have the freedom to make
further (accounting and institutional) separations in their railway system.
In Belgium the EU directives have always been followed in the strictest sense.
Hence, there are separate accounts for network and operations, and for public
services and other operations, but the incumbent (NMBS/SNCB) remained one in-
stitutional unit. Other member states, especially the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, have gone further. In these countries several
forms of institutional breakdown of the incumbent and tendering of train opera-
tions were put into practice.
The railway system, especially as regards freight transport, is considered an in-
ternational system. However, because of differences in technical standards,
borders still areserious barriers.This requires for costly investments in special lo-
comotives, and timely halts when crossing a border. In the context of market
opening the concept of the Trans European Rail Freight Network (TERFN)i s
launched by the European Commission. FromMarch 2003, there mustbe anopen
market for freight transport on this network. However, this solves only a part of
the interoperability problem because many of the technical differences remain.
For passengers, no market opening is foreseen yet.
Therailwaysystemisregardedasakeyforsustainablemobility.On boththelocal
and national level, investments in and use of railways may help to reduce road
congestion. Moreover, railways are less environmental unfriendly than road
transport. Railways, however, suffer from a lack of competitiveness to other
means of transport. Because of this the railways market share is even diminish-
ing. The last section of this chapter is devoted to the evolution of railways vis-à-
vis other means of transport.Working Paper 1-03
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b. The incumbent (NMBS/SNCB)
In Belgium, virtually the whole railway system is run by NMBS.1 For freight only
two other companies have a license to operate trains. The one is ICF,a ni n t e r n a -
tional co-operation in which NMBS participates. The other is an independent
company that started its operations in April 2002 and is the first competitor for
NMBS. For domestic passenger services there is no market opening as there is no
EU directive imposing this. International passenger trains are operated by sepa-
rate companies, which are cooperatives of the respective national incumbents.
Virtually allshares of NMBSareheldbythe State.Only0.2%isheldbyother share-
holders, who are all private persons. In its turn, NMBS is shareholder of more than
200 companies in Belgium and abroad. Of these companies, about 140 are consol-
idated into the NMBS balance sheet. They represent 9% of the balance-sheet value.
The company is subdivided into the following divisions:
- Domestic passenger transport: this includes the public service obligations
(PSO), which are train operations and network maintenance;
- International passenger transport: Eurostar, Thalys, TGV and conventional
day- and night- express trains;
- Freight transport;
- ABX Logistics: actually a road transport company with hardly any direct
link to railway operations;
- Telecommunications: a large optical fibre network, originally built for inter-
nal communication, but also offered for use by telecoms operators.
Despite the public ownership, NMBS is administratively and legally independent
from the State. The law only imposes PSO,w h i c ha r et h ep r o v i s i o no fd o m e s t i c
passenger transport and the maintenance of the railway network. The conditions
under which these PSO are carried out are laid down in quinquennial manage-
ment contracts with the State. The first covered 1992-1996, the second 1997-2001,
the third was still being negotiated in late 2002.
NMBS is faced with the following challenges:
- Indebtedness: NMBS is heavily indebted because in recent years many
investments were financed with borrowed capital instead of State trans-
fers. To get out of this situation, the Government has announced to grad-
ually take over the debts, as recommended by the EU and already done in
other countries. A condition for the takeover is that the total public debt
has fallen below the threshold of 100% of GDP,w h i c hi sn o te x p e c t e dt o
happen before 2005;
- Passenger traffic: In 2000, the Government imposed an objective to
increase transport by 50% and committed itself to contribute additional
amounts for investments. In ten years time, this additional contribution
would gradually increase from 25 to 250 million euro per year. Neverthe-
less, heavy efforts are required to attract significantly more passengers
than the ‘natural’ growth;
- Freight market opening: Given the strategic location of Belgium in the Euro-
pean transport market, the freight liberalisation of 2003 involves both
opportunities and threats for NMBS. To cope with the new situation, the
cargo department needs a thorough restructuring;
1. NMBS = Nationale Maatschappij der Belgische Spoorwegen; SNCB = Société Nationale des
Chemins de Fer Belge; in English: Belgian National Railway Company.Working Paper 1-03
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- Social relations: Given the historic power of the trade unions it is impor-
tant for management to retain on good terms with them;
- Institutional unity: Contrary to many other European countries, NMBS
remains one institutional unit. The question, however, is whether this is
tenable in the long run, given the EU requirements to open the freight
market and the demands of some to regionalise part of the activities;
- Regionalising: There is political pressure to give the Belgian regions (at
least) more influence in financing investments and operations.
Investment plans include the completion of the three high-speed lines (in the di-
rections of Lille, Cologne and Amsterdam); the development of a metropolitan
commuter network for Brussels; the modernisation of some major stations; and
the removal of bottle-necks for freight operations. The total amount of invest-
ments is divided among the Flemish and Walloon regions according to a 60/40-
ratio. The investment plan and regional division of the funds is based on a recent
agreement between the federal Government and the regional Governments on
railway investments for the period 2001-2012. Furthermore, NMBS recently un-
folded a new strategy for the future. Market share and productivity must be
increased. The freight section will be reorganised. To safeguard the company’s fi-
nancial health, more public compensation is needed for carrying out the PSO.
2. Legal framework
a. EU level
The gradual liberalisation of the European railway market was commenced by
the Council with three directives (91/440/EEC,9 5 / 1 8 / EC and 95/19/EC). These
directives did not institute market opening yet, they rather shaped the conditions
for market opening in later years. The most important items from Directive 91/
440 are:
- Separation of interests: railway companies must be administratively inde-
pendent and should make a separation (at least in their accounts)
between network management and train operations;
- Access to the network: international cooperatives in passenger and freight
transport and international combined transport services have the right of
access to the national railway networks;
- Public service: obligations and other agreements must be concluded
according to the principles that apply to commercial companies;
- Healthy finances: this should be assured by adequate financial structures,
and may not be hampered by excessive debts.
The other two directives are technical supplements to 91/440. Directive 95/18 ar-
ranges the granting of licences. It gives the conditions a railway company must
fulfil to obtain a license, and regulates the safety certificates. Licenses and certifi-
cates are to be granted by a government-nominated body. Directive 95/19
arranges the assignment of capacity (slots on the railway network) to the users,
and the imposition of a levy for the use of the infrastructure. To this end, each
country must nominate an independent network manager, and establish a capac-
ity manager and a house of appeals.Working Paper 1-03
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The only market opening that was instituted by the three directives was the right
of access for international cooperatives and operators in combined transport. The
actualmarketopeningstartedwithanothersetofthreedirectives(2001/12,2001/
13 and 2001/14). This package partly gives further arrangements to the prior di-
rectives. However, more important is the timetable for the opening of the
international rail freight market. By March 2003, this market opening must have
taken place on a specific set of main lines, named the Trans European Rail Freight
Network (TERFN). In 2008 this will be followed by a full market opening. For pas-
sengers and domestic freight, no market opening is foreseen by the EU yet.
b. Belgian level
In Belgiumthe EU railwaydirectiveshavebeenfollowedinthestrictestsense.The
first package of three directives was transposed into Belgian law by Royal and
Ministerial Decrees during 1997-1999. This implies that the conditions for market
opening are implemented, and there is some room for entry in the freight market.
The conversion of the other three is in process. In July 2002 the Government ap-
proved a conversion model, but further legislative texts are still awaited.
Nevertheless, under normal circumstances the first stage of freight market open-
ing in March 2003 is assured. By then, a regulator must become active. This
regulator will be in charge of capacity management, infrastructure levies and
safety certificates. Furthermore, a house of appeals will be established. At
present, regulatory tasks are still carried out by the Ministry of Transport.
Besides the implementation of the EU directives, important legal arrangements
are made in the 21 March 1991 Act on the reform of public enterprises. This act
lays down the administrative and legal independence of NMBS from the Govern-
ment. This independence, however, is limited by that same act because NMBS
must fulfil PSO, in particular domestic passenger transport and network mainte-
nance. The rules and conditions under which NMBS must carry out its PSO are laid
down in quinquennial management contracts.
The present management contract covers 1997-2001, whereas a new one is being
negotiated. The 1997-2001 contract sets basic principles for the governance of the
company, such as a strive for efficiency and the fulfilment of tasks imposed by
law. More important, the contract contains minimum requirements concerning
the PSO and an investment plan for infrastructure and rolling stock. The contract
also sets the financial compensation for these tasks. Furthermore, the company
must fulfil tasks for the need of the nation (defence, mail transport, etc.), enhance
rules of conduct and quality, and make strategic plans. The company has the free-
dom of price setting, albeit in coordination with the Government. In 2000 there
have been two supplements to the contract. Among others, these supplements
contain agreements on new investments in infrastructure and rolling stock.
Besides the EU directives and the 21 March 1991 Act, some further legal texts are
of importance:
- In 1997 a company named HST-Fin was established by law. This is a com-
pany with the objective to finance the three high-speed lines on the Bel-
gian territory. It is funded by NMBS,t h eS t a t e ,EU subsidies and a Dutch
contribution. Until 2006 NMBS obtains a fixed dividend, and a variable
dividend thereafter.Working Paper 1-03
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- In 2000 an agreement on mobility was made within the government. For
the railways, this agreement set the objective to have its output increased
by 50% in 2010. Evidently, this has serious implications both for the
demand and the supply side, namely in attracting travellers and freight
and providing sufficient capacity and train services.
- In 2002 an agreement on a new investment plan was made between the
federal Government, the regional Governments and NMBS.T h i sp l a nc o v -
ers the period 2001-2012 and involves a total amount of 17 billion euro.
- Also in 2002, a law was voted that imposes a separation of the public
service from other activities in the accounts of NMBS,a n dan e wm a n a g e -
ment structure. This would improve the relation between the State and
NMBS, increase accounting transparency, and improve the performance of
the company.1
c. Summary role of the government
The Belgian Government is owner and authority of the railways. As an owner, it
appoints its representatives on the board of the company, and may also influence
managementappointments.However,italsohasto takeaccountoftheindepend-
ence stipulated by the 1991 EU directive. As an authority it sets and pays for the
PSO. It may also use the railways as a policy instrument for mobility, for example
by investments and pricing policy. In the 2000 agreement and the investment
plans it does so, although the 50% growth objective is rather voluntaristic and no
strategy is worked out on how to attain the objective.
Until the market opening of March 2003 the Government also serves as a market
regulator. The tasks involved are carried out by the Technische Steundienst voor
het Spoorvervoer, which falls under the Ministry of Transport.2 The Ministry is
and will remain responsible for awarding licences to railway operators. Theother
tasks involved will be assigned to two regulating bodies which must become ac-
tive after the market opening. The first regulator will be in charge of capacity
management and infrastructure charges. These tasks are typical tasks for a net-
work operator, but are assigned to a separate body because the Belgian network
operator (NMBS) is not independent from the incumbent train operator (NMBS as
well). The other regulator will monitor the sector and serve as a house of appeals.
T h e s et a s k sa r ec o m p a r a b l et ot h o s eo fBIPT and CREG. NMBS will remain responsi-
ble for the issue of safety certificates.
3. Progress in market opening
Market opening in Belgium only concerns freight. For passengers no liberalisa-
tion is foreseen for the time being. As mentioned, the EU directives have been
followed in the strictest sense. Hence there are separated accounts, and competi-
tors are admitted on specifically assigned lines. Up to now this has led to the
entry of only one competitor, and an expression of interest by a few others. Since
April 2002 this company runs four or five trains per week from Antwerp to Mu-
nich. Although not formalised by law yet, the first real stage of the market
1. This law actually is an amendment to the 1991 law.
2. Loosely translated as ‘office for technical support to the railways’.Working Paper 1-03
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opening of international freight transport is expected to be realised in March
2003. Full opening of this segment is expected to be realised in 2008.
A serious obstacle for the market opening is the unity of the incumbent. When
network management and train operations are separated it is relatively easy to
make further separations of the latter. However, some fear that this will lead to
regionalising and privatisation. As regards the latter, trade unions expect that
jobs will be lost and/or working conditions deteriorate.
Another serious obstacle for the market opening is the lack of interoperability
w i t hf o r e i g nr a i l w a yn e t w o r k s .Al o c o m o t i v ec a n n o tm o v ef r e e l ya l o n gt h eE u r o -
pean network, as a truck can. At each border (and sometimes even within a
country) a train runs foul of another voltage and signalling system, or another
maximum width and height of the trains. In some countries there are other safety
regulations, or even another gauge. This is of course not a Belgian but a European
problem. For Belgium the situation is as follows:
- All neighbouring countries have a different voltage. In the Netherlands
t h et y p eo fc u r r e n ti st h es a m e( DC), but the voltage half that of Belgium.
In France and Germany, the system is AC, and with a different voltage
each.
- All neighbouring countries also have different signalling and automatic
train control systems.1
Locomotives that are suitable for more than one voltage or signalling system are
very expensive. This serves as a serious barrier to entry which is only partly lev-
elled by the use of diesel locomotives, and then at the cost of more pollution. In
EU context efforts are made to attain standardisation, but progress is slow.
Not an obstacle but an important point of attention is the priority for passengers
versus freight trains in capacity assignment and daily traffic control. For political
reasons, passenger trains often get priority over freight trains. For capacity as-
signment this implies that freight trains often have scheduled waiting times for
half an hour or more at certain stations. For daily traffic control it sometimes im-
plies significant delays at arrival. Evidently, this is not good for the
competitiveness of railways vis-à-vis other means of goods transport. The issue of
priority thus requires serious attention in the context of market opening.
B.Specific topics concerning the railways
1. Access to the network
When network operations are separated from downstream service provision,and
competitors are admitted to the network, a new market exists for transactions
that were formerly carried out within one company. This market concerns the op-
erators’ rights of access to the network. Just as this was the case for telecoms and
energy, this is the case for railways. In the European context this is a strongly reg-
ulated market. According to the 2001 directives a levy for the use of the network
must be charged from all train operators. This levy must be declared by an inde-
1. Automatic train control is a system that interferes by automatically stopping the train when the
driver ignores a danger signal.Working Paper 1-03
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pendent body, and according to marginal cost principles. It may not be
discriminating. The revenues must be used for the maintenance of the network.
However, because the marginal cost principles apply, the revenues do usually not
cover all maintenance costs. Therefore, network maintenance also remains on the
government budgets. Belgium was one of the last EU countries to introduce such
a network levy. The charge (on average 0.70 euro per trainkm) is relatively low,
but there exist countries with even lower charges.
Access to the network in practice requires the assignment of slots to the incum-
bent and its competitors. A just assignment of slots requires non-discrimination
between the applicants. Non-discrimination requires an independent capacity
manager.Therefore, EUDirective95/19stipulates theestablishmentofsuch an in-
dependent capacity manager. This may be the network manager when it is
separated from the incumbent, it may also be a separate body. In Belgium a sep-
arate body will be nominated, because network management is still carried out
by NMBS.
Note that the issue of access and the tasks of the network manager are not limited
to international freight traffic. Also passenger and domestic freight services are
involved. Firstly, when assigning slots one has to take account of all use that is
madeofthenetwork.Afinescheduleintegrating localandexpresstrains,passen-
ger and freight trains must be designed every year. Secondly, all services are due
to pay network levies. For NMBS this of course involves an accounting transfer
from passenger and domestic freight transport to network maintenance.
2. Public service obligations
In general railways have no USO, as for example telecoms and postal services
have. Rail is just one of the available means to convey persons and freight. Other
opportunities are given by the road, air and water networks. Railways, however,
do have PSO. From the second management contract, the PSO are summarised as
follows:
- Domestic transport of passengers by scheduled trains, including the domes-
tic section of international trains: NMBS must meet minimum production
standards and is obliged to draft a traffic plan. To give some examples,
this concerns the number of train-stops at each station, the number of
train kms produced and the application of certain tariff reduction
schemes;
- Purchase, construction, maintenance, management and operations of infrastruc-
ture and investments in rolling stock: NMBS commits itself to the investments
that are programmed in the investment plan 1996-2005. Annual invest-
ment programmes are submitted to the State. Investments that are
financed by the State must be approved by the Minister of Transport.
There are separate accounts for maintenance, management and opera-
tions of the network;
- T a s k sf o rt h en e e do ft h en a t i o n :A m o n gt h et a s k sa r et r a n s p o r ti m p o s e db y
the Administration, military duties and services for De Post;
The management contract also sets the State compensation for PSO,a l t h o u g ht h e
precise amount is determined on a year-by-year basis. In 2001, the State paid
about 360 million euro for domestic passenger transport. For purchase, construc-
tion, maintenance, management and operations of infrastructure andWorking Paper 1-03
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investments in rolling stock NMBS got 1.4 billion euro. Furthermore, there are
compensations for the tasks for the need of the nation, pensions, injuries and oth-
er financial duties of the State;
At present, a third management contract is being negotiated. The precise content
of this contract is not known yet. However, since the conclusion of the previous
contract the State contribution has grown from 2.1 to 2.3 billion per year.
3. Welfare effects
As there has been hardly any market opening there are no welfare effects yet.
Nevertheless something can be said about prices and quality in relation to the
management contract.
a. Prices
NMBS only has a limited freedom to set its prices. Prices for passenger services are
determined in conformity with the Government so that generally no advantage
can be taken from a monopoly position. It is not easy to say whether the present
prices are too high or too low. Given the enormous Government dotation one
might conclude that the prices are too low to cover the costs of operating a rail-
way system. However, one might question whether it is right to recharge the cost
of PSO to the users, as users of other modes of transport often pay less than the
social cost of their traffic too. Moreover, pricing may be used by the Government
as an instrument of transport and mobility policies.
As regards freight traffic, prices seem to be relatively high in Belgium. As no pub-
lished data on freight prices is available, an approximation can be made by the
average turnover per tonne km. In Belgium this is almost one and a half times as
high as in the neighbouring countries.1 This indicates that prices are relatively
high in Belgium, and there may be room for improvement of efficiency.
b. Quality
As shown above, the management contract requires for a number of measures to
enhance quality. Important indicators for quality are safety and punctuality.
Punctuality is the extent to which trains arrive at their destination without delay,
and which is a sensitive quality element for the user. As regards safety, the safety
certificates imposed by Directive 95/18 should warrant that railway services nor-
mally meet high safety standards.
In general, Belgium performs well as regards safety and quality, but there is still
room for improvement. In 1996 and 1997 together there were 44 fatal casualties
on 285 million passengers. This is 1.54 per 10 million passengers. This was slight-
ly better than the EU average of 1.60, and more or less the same as in the
neighbouring countries (ranging from 1.14 to 1.61).
1. Based on numbers for 2000, see FPB (2002).Working Paper 1-03
89
As regards quality and according to measurements by NMBS itself, the standard
for punctuality is almost met. In 1999, 94% of the passenger trains arrived in time
or with a delay of at most 5 minutes at their final destination, whereas the stand-
ard is 95%. In 1996 the punctuality was only 91%. There are plans to introduce a
system of ticket-repayment for serious delays.
A study by Harvard University (1999) put Belgium at 5.5 on a scale from 1 to 7 on
the basis of a questionnaire about several aspects of quality. The Netherlands had
about the same score, but Germany and France did significantly better (6.3 and
6.7, respectively). The UK and Italy did significantly less (4.3 and 3.5,
respectively).
4. Other topics: modal split
To a higher extent than the other network industries presented in this paper, rail-
ways are in competition with other industries, namely road, air and water
transport.Thepositionitoccupiesisparadoxical.On theonehand,railwayshave
clear advantages in safety, environment and mobility, in particular when com-
pared toroadand air.Ontheother,itsmarketshareislowand forfreightitiseven
falling.
In 1970, NMBS carried 247 million passengers, but in 1980 this had fallen to 164
million.1986 gave a low of139 million.In 1999 there were 147 million passengers,
which was the highest number since 1984. The market share, in terms of passen-
gerkm,fellfrom11%in1970to7%in1990,andstabilisedat6%in1995,seeFigure
19. The market share of international passenger transport gradually grew from
7% in 1992 to 8.5% in 1999.
FIGURE 19 - Modal shift for passenger transport in Belgium, 1970-1998
Sources: NIS/INS and NMBS/SNCB.












For long, the transport of freight oscillates around 60 million tonnes per year. De-
spite some fluctuations, this is a rather stable number. About 70% consists of
traffic from and to the Belgian seaports. The port of Antwerp alone is good for
45% of the freight traffic. Because of the ever growing amount of goods transport-
ed, a stable traffic implies a falling market share. Figure 20 shows that this market
share, measured in tonne km, has fallen from 28% in 1970 to only 15% in 1998.
FIGURE 20 - Modal shift for freight transport in Belgium, 1970-1998
Sources: NIS/INS and NMBS/SNCB.
* Vessel and pipeline.
For passengers and freight, the Belgian market shares are remarkably close to the
EU average: 6% and 14% in 1998, respectively. For passengers, there are no excep-
tionallylargedifferencesbetweenthememberstates.Theneighbouringcountries
do somewhatbetter than Belgium, with marketshares upto 8%(theNetherlands,
after Austria having the second largest market share in the EU). In the UK the mar-
ket share is 5%. For freight the differences are larger, from 2% in Greece to 37% in
Austria and Sweden. In the neighbouring countries the market shares range from
4% in the Netherlands (with a remarkable 42% for inland waterways) to 16% in
France and Germany.
There are several reasons for the paradoxical nature of railways in the transport
markets. From the point of view of the demand side, the use of car and truck is
more attractive than the use of the train. Road traffic gives cost and (usually) time
savings,flexibility andindependence.Moreover,attempts tomakerailways more
attractive have been insufficiently successful, in particular for freight traffic. For
example, in many countries there have been insufficient commitments to bring














Anderloni, L., & O. Pilley, 2002, Changing Context for Postal Systems in Europe.
In R. Ruozi & L. Anderloni (Eds.), Modernisation and Privatisation of Postal Sys-
tems in Europe. Springer, Berlin.
B e r g m a n ,L . ,C .D o y l e ,J .G u a l ,L .H u l t k r a n t z ,D .N e v e n ,L . - H .R ö l l e r&L .W a t e r -
man, 1998, Europe’s Network Industries: Conflicting Priorities.C e n t r ef o r
Economic Policy Research, London, and Center for Business and Policy Stud-
ies, Stockholm.
Blöndal, S., & D. Pilat, 1997, The Economic Benefits of Regulatory Reform. OECD
Economic Studies, No. 28.
Comité Consultatif pour les Télécommunications (CCT), 2001, 8ème Rapport An-
nuel. Bruxelles.
Commission Européenne (CE), 2002, Etude sur les services d’intérêt économique
général auprès des citoyens des 15 pays de l’Union Européenne - Rapport final.
Bruxelles.
Commission for the Regulation of Electricity and Gas (CREG), 2001a, Annual Re-
port.B r u s s e l s .
Commission for the Regulation of Electricity and Gas (CREG), 2001b, Indicative
Plan of Natural Gas Supply. Brussels.
De Vil, G., C. Kegels & M. van Overbeke, 2002, Production and Diffusion of ICT in
Belgium, A Comparative Analysis. Working Paper No. 1-02. Federal Planning
Bureau, Brussels.
Distrigas, 2001, Annual Report.B r u s s e l s .
Economic Policy Committee (EPC), 2002, Annual Report on Structural Reforms 2002.
Brussels.
Electrabel, 2001, Annual Report. Brussels.
ELIA, 2001, Activity Report. Brussels.Working Paper 1-03
92
E u r o p e a nC e n t r a lB a n k( ECB), 2001, Price Effects of Regulatory Reform in Selected
Network Industries. Frankfurt am Main.
European Commission (EC), 2001a, Market Performance of Network Industries Pro-
viding Services of General Interest: A First Horizontal Assessment. Brussels.
European Commission (EC), 2001b, Rail Market Monitoring Scheme: Proposal by the
Commission. Brussels.
European Commission (EC), 2001c, 7th Report on the Implementation of the Telecom-
munications Regulatory Package. Brussels.
European Commission (EC), 2002a, 8th Report on the Implementation of the Telecom-
munications Regulatory Package. Brussels.
European Commission (EC), 2002b, Implementing the Internal Energy Market: First
Benchmarking Report.B r u s s e l s .
European Commission (EC), 2002c, Second Benchmarking Report on the Implementa-
tion of the Internal Electricity and Gas Market. Brussels.
European Competitive Telecommunications Association (ECTA), 2002, DSL Score-
card: End of June.B r u s s e l s .
European Information Technology Observatory (EITO), 2002, Annual Report 2001.
Frankfurt am Main
Federal Planning Bureau (FPB), 2002, Short Term Update 4-02, Quarterly Newsletter.
Brussels
Federation of the Electricity Companies in Belgium (FPE/BFE), 2000, Statistical
Yearbook. Linkebeek.
Federation of the Electricity Companies in Belgium (FPE/BFE), 2001, Statistical
Yearbook. Linkebeek.
Figas, 2000, Statistical Yearbook. Brussels.
Figas, 2001, Statistical Yearbook. Brussels.
Fluxys, 2001, Annual Report. Brussels.
Harvard University, 1999, The Global Competitiveness Report 1999. Cambridge.
Ilzkovitz, F., R. Meiklejohn & U. Mogensen, 1999, Liberalisation of Network In-
dustries: Economic Implications and Main Policy Issues. European Economy,
No.4 1999.Working Paper 1-03
93
Institut Belge des Services Postaux et des Télécommunications (IBPT/BIPT), 2001,
7ème Rapport d’Activité. Bruxelles.
Institut Belge des Services Postaux et des Télécommunications (IBPT/BIPT), 2002,
8ème Rapport d’Activité. Bruxelles.
Institut Belge des Services Postaux et des Télécommunications (IBPT/BIPT), 2003,
Plan de Gestion Semestriel de l’IBPT Janvier à Juin 2003. Bruxelles.
Institut d’Économie Industrielle - Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse
(IEI), 1999, Network Industries and Public Services. European Economy,N o . 4
1999.
International Energy Agency (IEA) & Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), 2001, Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Belgium 2001
Review.P a r i s .
Laffont, J.-J., & J. Tirole, 2000, Competition in Telecommunications. MIT Press,
Cambridge.
Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2002, Economic Reform of the Products, Services and
Capital Markets: Belgian Report for the European Union.B r u s s e l s .
Molle, W., 1990,TheEconomics of European Integration: Theory, Practice, Policy.Da rt-
mouth, Aldershot.
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2002a, Com-
munications Outlook.P a r i s .
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2002b, Infor-
mation Technology Outlook.P a r i s .
Van der Linden, J.A., 1998, Interdependence and Specialisation in the European Union:
Intercountry Input-Output Analysis and Economic Integration. Labyrint, Capelle
aan den IJssel.